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Abstract 
 
The War of 1812: The End of an Uncommon Alliance 
 
The War of 1812 was a struggle between three groups: Americans, British, and 
Native Americans.  The British and the Native Americans were brought together in their 
necessity to fight the Americans.  The alliance began during the French and Indian War 
while defeating the French.  Throughout the rest of the eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century the British and Natives would support each other in a mutually 
beneficial alliance.  The end of the War of 1812 would also be the end of the once great 
alliance. 
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Introduction 
Native Americans have played a major role in the way the North American continent was 
formed.  Living for years as they pleased, their world began to change as Europeans began to 
move in.  They tried to carry on with their traditional way of life, but it was becoming 
increasingly difficult.  They would be forced to adapt and partner with these newcomers to 
survive.  The British-Native American alliance was formed during the eighteenth century and 
remained strong until the Treaty of Ghent, the treaty that ended the War of 1812.  It played a 
major role in shaping the way North America looks today. 
 The Native Americans would adapt to the changing world by trading.  The lucrative fur 
trade was a major economic driving force in North America.  The French and British would 
compete for Native American support during the French and Indian War.  The Native-British 
Alliance was a mutually beneficial alliance that would be formed during the mid-eighteenth 
century, but would not survive the War of 1812.  Historical evidence points to the British 
needing Native support to protect Canada, while the Native Americans needed Britain to furnish 
weapons and food.  The alliance worked well during the French and Indian War and the 
Revolutionary War, but crumbled with the Treaty of Ghent and the end of the War of 1812.  
 Chapter one looks back through the European-Indian Alliances that shows how the 
Native Americans had been treated in North America.  The French and Indian War was one of 
the first major European conflicts that directly impacted the Native Americans.  Current 
historiography focuses much of their effort on the British or American side of the War of 1812.  
Comparatively a much smaller amount of work has gone into Native American discussion. 
Author Richard White discusses the intricate system of gift-giving that was established during 
this early period of Native-European interaction.  He contends that this system laid the 
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groundwork for future relations between Native Americans settlers in North America.  Other 
authors, such as Walter Borneman and William Fowler Jr. give details about the how the specific 
tribes decided to side with France or Britain.  Some sided with France and others with Britain, 
but it is certain that the relationship with the Native Americans and the British changed 
following this conflict.
1
 
 The British were now the premier power in North America, but the Native Americans did 
not want a ruler.  The British refusal to treat the Native Americans in the same manner as the 
French caused problems.  Pontiac’s Rebellion broke out and the British realized the full strength 
of the Native Americans.  By passing the Proclamation of 1763 the British attempted to pacify 
the Native Americans, but it represented a push in the buffer state/reservation direction for the 
Native Americans.  They also reinstituted the system of gift-giving and the alliance between the 
two was strengthened again.
2
  
 The British were locked in another struggle in the later part of the eighteenth century with 
the American colonies.  The British needed the Native Americans again to help stem the tide of 
the war.  Historian Alan Taylor goes in depth about the British-Native relationship during this 
time.  Although the independence of the United States was recognized, the British left 
themselves in a position to fight another day.  Native American rights were not pushed by the 
British in the war with France or the United States, they continued their system of gift-giving on 
American soil.  They also retained key forts on American soil in order to hold influence with the 
local tribes.
3
 
                                                          
1
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2
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Without British military support, the Native Americans suffered after the United States 
gained independence.  John Sugden’s biography on Tecumseh deals with the Native American 
plight during this time period and how the young warrior sought to bolster the chances of the 
Native Americans regaining their land.  Sugden describes the journey of Tecumseh and his 
brother, the Prophet, as they formed the largest Native American alliance ever seen.  The Native-
British alliance was a necessity in the eyes of Tecumseh because it represented a possible last 
chance to stave off American encroachment.
4
 
 The second chapter of the thesis deals with the impact of the Native Americans during 
the War of 1812.  Again, Alan Taylor goes on to describe in detail the many positive 
contributions that the Native Americans make during conflict.  The Native Americans provided 
large numbers of warriors to protect Canada.  They also fought specific engagements on their 
own against the Americans and most importantly they provided a psychological advantage in the 
war.  Taylor also goes on to describe some of the negative impacts the Native Americans had and 
how it affected the British-Native alliance.  Often times they would not listen to commanding 
British officers and actually went against what was asked of them.  The negative actions fueled 
anti-British American propaganda and helped the American war effort.  Chapter Two also deals 
with Tecumseh and Isaac Brock.  James Laxer looks in depth at their relationship and how 
similar the two were.  The deaths of these two individuals would severely strain the alliance and 
have consequences during the peace process.
5
 
Finally, the third chapter looks at the end of the British-Native alliance.   Mark Zuehlke 
provides in-depth detail about the negotiations that took place at Ghent.  The peace talks open 
with the British delegation pushing for a Native American state, but really only pushing this 
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agenda to provide a buffer zone between British Canada and the United States.  The Native 
Americans were again left out of the peace treaty and the alliance with Britain is effectively over.   
The conclusion offers a brief analysis of how the Native Americans were treated after the Treaty 
of Ghent.
6
   
With the British-Native Americans alliance not a necessity anymore, the Native 
Americans were pushed onto reservations.  In Canada and the United States the ability to recover 
their homelands was now gone.  The United States and Britain would continue their push 
westward to the Pacific Ocean with little regard for the Native Americans in their path.  The War 
of 1812 was the last chance for the Native Americans to establish their lands and stem the tide of 
westward expansion.  They needed help though and world events would force Great Britain to 
abandon her allies at the negotiating table. 
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Chapter 1 – Origins of Cooperation 
The loss of identity for the Native Americans began with Europeans coming across the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Spanish conquistadors destroyed the Native American way of life in Central and 
South America, while the British and the French were the major European powers who disrupted 
Native American activities in North America.  By the early eighteenth century, virtually all of 
the Native Americans in North America were caught in the web of relationships created by the 
French, British, and Spanish penetrations of the continent.  The wars between the European 
powers in which battles occurred in North America drew the Native Americans into alliances 
with the French, the British, or the Spanish, and against other Native Americans who were 
aligned with opposing European powers.  Native Americans fought one another for territory, 
sometimes carrying on traditional hostilities but often compelled to migrate—and therefore clash 
– by the encroachment of settlers and the waxing and waning of European imperial projects.
7
  
The French and Indian War would be the first major conflict in which the Native Americans 
were courted by the European powers. 
The British colonies were well-entrenched along the eastern seaboard and most of the 
Native tribes had already been removed or exterminated from areas east of the Appalachian 
Mountains.  The ones that remained persisted in compact enclaves surrounded by colonial towns.  
They survived partially by assimilating to colonial culture, working for wages and accepting 
Christianity.
8
  The area west of these mountains was quite different.  A vast wilderness only 
explored and settled by rugged frontier families or traders was still dominated by powerful 
Native American tribes.  The Iroquois in New York, the Delaware in the Ohio Valley, the 
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Shawnee in Kentucky, the Miami in Indiana, the Creek in Georgia, the Ottawa in Upper Canada, 
and the Potawatomi in Michigan were some of the more formidable tribes in the interior of the 
continent and it was still their home.  The tribes fought against each other before the Europeans 
arrived, but now had to decide whether to align with the French or British. 
The French established trading posts at Fort Saint Joseph in 1691, Fort Ponchartrain 
along the Detroit River in 1701, and Fort Michilimackinac in 1715.  These forts, constructed in 
the Great Lakes region, established contact with the powerful Ottawa, Potawatomie, Chippewa, 
and Wyandot nations.  As more and more Native Americans relocated to the Ohio Country after 
1720 (many were pushed out by the powerful Iroquois Confederacy), the French-Canadians cast 
their eyes toward the possibility of the lucrative trade that might be fostered there.
9
  Fort Niagara 
was also constructed and since the Iroquois Confederacy’s presence worked to block British 
occupation, the French supported their claim to the land.  While generally agreeable to 
advantageous trading relations, most Native Americans came to resist European encroachments 
that had an air of permanency.  Passing trappers in canoes were one thing, but log cabins and 
planted fields were another.  The French wanted to dominate the fur trade and the money that 
came along with it.  The problem was English traders often captured large amounts of French fur 
and sent them east to Albany.  The powerful Iroquois confederacy tolerated the British, but 
regarded them as only a guest.  The strength of the confederacy was aimed at resisting European 
encroachment.   
 The French did not rely solely on trade to maintain strong relationships with the Native 
Americans.  Gifts became an important part of Native American society.  Such offerings were 
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presented to the Natives on a regular basis.  The British would learn from their French 
counterparts about the importance of gift-giving in the years leading up to the War of 1812.  
Gift-giving was an essential part of Native American culture because it was an indication of a 
chief’s wealth and power.  The more a chief received, the more he could give his followers, 
reflecting the esteem in which he was held.
10
  The system was expensive but necessary for 
consolidating that mutually beneficial relationship historian Richard White has called the 
“middle ground.”
11
  The “middle ground” theory was both a place and a style of cultural 
interaction.  The location was the region around the Great Lakes, especially the area between 
Lake Erie and the Ohio River.
12
  This middle ground was the exact area Tecumseh would be 
fighting for during the War of 1812.  In its initial stages it was a joint creation of French officials 
and traders and a host of Great Lakes native peoples who had been driven from their homes by 
mid-seventeenth-century wars with the Iroquois.
13
  Native Americans tolerated the French based 
on a fur trade that brought the tribes goods such as blankets, weapons, rum, and food.  The 
British, however, had not mastered the art of giving gifts to the Native Americans and would 
understand why it was so important immediately following the French and Indian War.   
Hostilities between the French and British began to increase as the British gradually 
expanded westward.  The British saw the expansion as both profitable and legal.  By Article 15 
of the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, France and Britain had agreed that the powerful 
Iroquois tribe would be subjects of the British Crown.  Since the Iroquois claimed the Ohio 
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Valley, the British, as their sovereign, took it to be theirs as well.
14
  The French rejected this 
claim and asserted that sovereignty over a mobile people such as the Iroquois could only be 
extended to persons, not to the lands through which they traveled.  The friction present between 
the European powers in North America was becoming apparent. 
During the French and Indian War, the British were able to sway the Native Americans to 
join their side in two ways.  The first way was to offer more gifts than the French.  The second 
way was promising the Native Americans their land would remain theirs.  The Treaty of Easton, 
signed in 1758, specified that the Native American nations would not fight on the side of the 
French against the British in the current war. In return, Pennsylvania returned large blocks of 
land which the Iroquois had ceded a few years before. The British colonial governors promised 
to recognize Iroquois and other tribes' rights to their hunting grounds in the Ohio River valley 
and they promised to refrain from establishing colonial settlements west of the Allegheny 
Mountains after the conclusion of the war. This clause of the treaty contributed to the Britain’s 
subsequent Proclamation of 1763, by which it attempted to reserve territory west of the 
Appalachians for Native Americans and prohibit European-American advancement into the 
area.
15
 
English colonists were also numerically superior to their French counterparts. The French 
Crown operated tight controls on emigration to its overseas colonies in North America.  French 
peasants could only emigrate with the permission of their landlords, while the harsh climate in 
France’s North American colony meant few nobles were interested in organizing such feudal 
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estates.
16
  Most occupants in France’s holdings were solitary farmers or fur traders.  In either 
case they did not put pressure on the Native Americans living near them or the land they used.  
The lack of settlers was a key point made by a French officer in 1753.  He told the Native 
Americans on the upper Ohio, “They [the English] plant all your country and drive you back so 
that in a little time you will have no land.  It is not so with us; though we build trading houses on 
your land, we do not plant it.”
17
  The French were trying to work with the Native Americans, not 
take from them.    
It is now easier to see how the Native Americans aligned themselves during the French 
and Indian War.  The French interacted with the Native Americans to gain their trade, their souls, 
their hand in marriage, or their comradeship in arms, but the British engaged with the Native 
Americans overwhelmingly with the intention of gaining their lands.  They created farms, 
villages, and cities.
18
  Many of the Great Lakes tribes sided with the French because of their 
history of gift-giving and lack of pressure on the land, but the Iroquois and others aligned with 
the British because of the lucrative fur trade centered in Albany and promises to give back land 
previously ceded (Treaty of Easton).  The Native Americans played a major role in the French 
and Indian War, hence the name, but a lengthy military undertaking was not necessary for this 
conflict because the outcome and how the Native Americans were dealt with was more 
important. 
The British were able to win the French and Indian War.  Native Americans did not go to 
war to preserve an old custom or to protest an economic policy: they strove to prevent their 
                                                          
16
 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 5. 
17
 Michael A. McConnell, “Charles-Michel Mouet de Landlade: Warrior, Soldier, and Intercultural ‘Window’ on the 
Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes.” In David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., The Sixty Years War for 
the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 2001). 
18
 Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 34. 
12 
 
social and political degradation.
19
  Native Americans were concerned about the economic 
situation they found themselves in after the war, but more importantly they did not want to be 
considered a subjugated people in their own lands.  When Indians reluctantly allowed the British 
to occupy abandoned French posts during the war, they did not have in mind grateful 
subordination to an empire of trade and troops. They hoped that the British would simply replace 
the French in the posts, dispense gifts, and accept the service of warriors going out against 
mutual enemies.
20
  The British were not the French and with the signing of the Treaty of Paris 
everything these tribes had known changed. 
As important as the Treaty of Paris was to restoring world order, another document 
emerged from the year 1763 that was arguably to have an even greater impact on the future of 
the British Empire, particularly in North America.  In July 1763, instructions were sent to all 
colonial governors in North America forbidding settlements west of the Appalachian 
Mountains.
21
  Under penalty of dismissal, the governors were further restrained from making any 
grants of such lands.  Three months later, these instructions were incorporated into what came to 
be called the Proclamation of 1763.  In the end, the lasting contribution of the Proclamation of 
1763 was that it proved that in Great Britain’s rush to bring order to its newly won empire, it had 
left one thorny matter unresolved, namely the Native American question. 
The Proclamation of 1763 was calculated to reduce friction with Native Americans in 
those territories recently won from France.  In reality, however, it failed to appease the Native 
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Americans and also served to frustrate westward-looking colonists.
22
  All land from the crest of 
the Appalachian Mountains on the east, and the Mississippi River on the west—including the 
Great Lakes and Ohio River valley—was designated a vast Native reserve.
23
 British forts would 
be maintained in this territory and transient traders were allowed, but permanent settlement was 
prohibited.  Any British subjects living west of the Appalachians were to remove themselves 
from such settlements.  
Before news of the proclamation even reached the Ohio River country, a number of 
Native American nations had taken matters into their own hands to oust the new British 
landlords.  Many Native Americans wondered what had happened to the Treaty of Easton signed 
five years earlier.  Not only were the British fortifying old French posts, they were also building 
new ones.  Most alarming was the permanent community rapidly rising in the shadow of Fort 
Pitt.
24
  
In the nineteenth century, historian Francis Parkman originally characterized the Native 
attacks in the summer of 1763 as the “conspiracy of Pontiac.”  Pontiac’s Rebellion did not start 
with Pontiac, as is often assumed.  Like Tecumseh, there was a spiritual aspect to the rebellion 
that often goes unnoticed. Pontiac’s role in the uprising is certain, but what is more certain is that 
a Delaware prophet, Neolin, had a vision that called on all Natives to reject their dependence on 
European-Americans.  He preached a message of returning to ancestral ways of life.  He spoke of 
eating only traditional foods, training boys with bows and arrows, and of quitting all commerce 
with white men.  Even though he was a Delaware prophet his message was grounded in the 
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concept of Native American racial unity in resistance to the evils brought by whites.
25
  He called 
on an avoidance of trade, a return to ritual warfare and diets, and the gradual abandonment of 
European-made goods.
26
   
As Gregory Dowd has stated, the Delaware prophet’s call for unity against whites, 
grounded as it was in a vision of divinely sanctioned Indian racial identity, represented a radical 
departure from “the heritage of Indian diversity and of highly localized, familial, and ethnically 
oriented government.”
27
  The Native Americans had been fiercely independent people before this 
desperate call for unity.  His message spread rapidly through the disheartened tribes of the Great 
Lakes region, but only parts of his message were heard.  It was the beginning of a pan-Indian 
alliance based on the common Native American characteristics.  Native Americans needed to 
resist European encroachment because they were Native American and their way of life was 
being trampled.   
Pontiac latched onto this early prophetic message, but realized a number of important 
factors in the message would be impossible to live by.  The Native Americans were at this point 
completely dependent upon the Europeans for survival.  It was not a matter of like or dislike, 
rather a matter of existence.  Natives received not only ammunition and guns from Europeans, 
but also food, blankets, mirrors, clothes, and iron pots.  Most Native Americans now constructed 
Euro-American style log cabins to live in.
28
  Trading with the Europeans had become a Native 
way of life and Pontiac realized completely shutting off this vital lifeline would have devastating 
effects on the Native population. 
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The Seneca tribe in the Iroquois Confederacy took Neolin’s (a Delaware Prophet) 
message one step further and plotted the destruction of their British landlords.  This was another 
split within the Iroquois Confederacy because the rest of the tribes remained friendly to the 
British, but the Senecas found willing allies further west among the other Great Lakes tribes.  
Even though the Native Americans presented a united front, there was still disunity among them. 
British attitudes in dealing with the Native Americans contributed greatly to the unrest 
after the French and Indian War.  Their attitude was far more arrogant and self-righteous than the 
more genial camaraderie of the French.  The British felt it was their right to occupy Indian 
territory after the war.  The real problem was Sir Jeffrey Amherst’s decision to stop the long-
established custom of gift-giving.
29
  His policy of eliminating the presents was taken to the 
extreme after the French were defeated.  At this point, the Native Americans had no other 
European power to trading partner.  They had to deal with the British or face ruin.  Against the 
advice of British Indian agents, Amherst insisted that all Indians trade for their merchandise on 
the basis of a published schedule of prices.
30
   
 It was at this point that Pontiac rose to power at this point with the help of Neolin’s 
message.  The Native Americans were able to capture every British outpost west of the 
Appalachian Mountains except for Fort Niagara, Fort Pitt, and Fort Detroit.  Pontiac led a siege 
of Detroit, but throughout the summer of 1763 the British garrison was able to hold out.  Finally, 
as the fall season approached, many of the warriors that had participated in the siege slipped 
away for the hunting season and to tend to their families.  British general Henry Bouquet 
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quipped, “We have visibly brought upon us this Indian war by being too saving of a few presents 
to the savages which properly distributed would certainly have prevented it.”
31
 
Though Pontiac and his allies won many battles, the war ultimately ended in a stalemate 
with the British, who were forced to alter their policies and to establish a relationship with the 
native peoples of the region similar to the one that had existed with the French.  The “middle 
ground” was restored and peaceful relations returned to the British-Indian alliance.  In October 
1763, the British government issued the Royal Proclamation, which recognized a vast “Indian 
Reserve” that stretched from the Appalachians to the Mississippi River and from the Floridas to 
Canada.  The British were already moving toward the policies spelled out in the proclamation, 
but the armed struggle convinced them that white settlers and Native Americans must be kept 
apart and that the settlers should not be permitted to encroach on Native lands.
32
  The problem 
was the settlers would not be bound to this line and a decade later would be fighting against the 
British for their own independence. 
  The Native Americans faced a predicament when hostilities broke out between the young 
United States and the preeminent world power Great Britain.  The Natives were again trapped 
between two white worlds.  Both the British and the colonies recognized the military potential of 
the thousands of armed warriors living on the frontiers, and from 1775, as they slid into war, 
both sides competed for Native support.
33
  The British made more of an effort to court the Native 
Americans with increased gift giving and had already fought a war with Native American help. 
Both sides in the conflict recognized Native warriors as a force to be reckoned with, and 
they had an interest in recruiting them to their cause or at least neutralizing them.  The Iroquois 
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Confederacy, referred to its commercial and strategic relationship with the English as the 
“Covenant Chain.”  A portion of the Shawnees along the Ohio River felt neutrality was the best 
plan because it would not serve their interests to get involved in a white man’s war.
34
  Many of 
the Shawnees, along with other tribes, eventually sided with the British.  They could expect to 
receive arms and provisions from the British.  The newly founded United States proved 
incapable of outfitting the Native Americans with weapons or provisions for their families.  This 
in turn, led more neutral Indian nations to become antagonistic towards the Americans.   
The Treaty of Paris did not quash native resistance to the seizure of their land.  The war 
between the British and the Colonies exacerbated the political divisions among the Natives.  
Both sides in the conflict recognized Native warriors as a force to be reckoned with, and they had 
an interest in recruiting them to their cause or at least neutralizing them.  The British drew the 
Iroquois leader Joseph Brant to their side.  He led the Mohawk tribe against the Patriots in 
northern New York.  The entire Iroquois confederacy joined the British side in 1777, but other 
Native Americans remained neutral.   
The Shawnees were already forced out of the Kentucky territory into Ohio.  The 
Kentucky militia launched raids into Shawnee settlements across the Ohio River.  As a boy, 
Tecumseh was forced to move many times due to this military activity.  The Shawnee remained 
a formidable force throughout the Revolutionary War.  According to one estimate, over the 
course of the conflict, the Native Americans killed 860 men who had been trained as soldiers in 
Kentucky.  The Iroquois waged a similar struggle throughout New York against an influx of 
white settlers.
35
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In 1783, the Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War, but not the conflict with the 
Native Americans.  The United States was recognized as an independent nation.  By the treaty 
Britain transferred the sovereignty of most land south of the Great Lakes and east of the 
Mississippi to the new United States without the feeblest attempt to protect the rights of it’s yet 
to be defeated Indian allies who occupied much of the region.  The American Congress moved 
quickly to take advantage of the situation.  Before the end of the year it resolved to annex huge 
territories north of the Ohio and east of the Great Miami River on the grounds of conquest.  Once 
seized, the land could be used to reward military veterans or sold to replenish the treasury of the 
desperate federal government. 
 Some tribes, like the Shawnee, found themselves in a familiar situation they had been in 
before.  Just as the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) took their hunting grounds in Kentucky, now 
the new republic planned to strip them of their remaining territory.  Anglo-American occupants 
in North America had little regard for Native American rights.   
Interestingly, even though on American soil, the British did not completely abandon their 
Native alliance.  They held on to possession of strategic forts on American soil for years after the 
treaty was signed.  The British were aware of Indian discontent after the Revolutionary War.  
They were frightened that Native American discontent would come back to hurt them much like 
Pontiac’s rebellion.  They postponed abandoning key posts such as Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, 
and Michilimackinac, even though they were on the American side of the new international 
boundary.  Encouraged by the failure of the United States to live up to all of its obligations under 
the Treaty of Paris, Britain retained some of these posts for over a decade, and used them to 
disperse presents and supplies to the Natives.  They also wanted to keep the lucrative fur trade 
19 
 
alive south of the Great Lakes.
36
  This proved to the tribes that their King had not abandoned 
them.  They were keeping the door open for a future use of the Indian alliance. 
Britain was in a difficult situation.  Some would say the British gave up during the 
Revolutionary War, leaving the Americans ill-prepared to fight another day.  They knew the 
Natives were indispensable to the protection of the Crown’s weak Canadian colonies, as well as 
valuable partners in the lucrative fur trade, and it was essential to maintain their vigor and 
goodwill.  Conversely, Britain did not want to be dragged into a war between the Native 
Americans and the United States, or accused of inciting tribes against their American neighbors.  
So the British continued to supply the Native Americans with the usual provisions and advised 
the Natives to insist on their rights peacefully.
37
 
The Treaty of Paris directly impacted large groups of Native Americans.  Iroquois leader 
Joseph Brant convinced the governor of Quebec to grant land for a Mohawk settlement of the 
Niagara River.  In the fall of 1784, the Iroquois divided, with half of the people following Brant 
to the British side and half of the people remaining in New York.   
Even though America had just received independence, the Treaty of Paris did not quell 
Native resistance to the seizure of their land.  Brant returned to New York to provide leadership 
for Native Americans living in the newly formed United States.  He believed that land 
negotiations between the Americans and individual tribes were illegitimate.  The confederacy as 
a whole had to agree to any sales of land, because the lands of the Native Americans were a 
common holding, a holding that included the territory on which their settlements were 
established as well as their hunting grounds.  In December 1786, Brant and the Shawnee chief 
Blue Jacket participated in the formation of an alliance of northwestern tribes – Iroquois, Hurons, 
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Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Miamis, and the Wabash River tribes – 
whose delegates assembled in a council at the mouth of the Detroit River.  The common goal of 
this alliance was to hold onto Native American lands as agreed to in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 
in 1768.  In a message they sent to the U.S. Congress, the members of the confederacy insisted 
that any cession of lands to the U.S. “should be made in the public manner, and by the united 
voice of the confederacy; holding all partial treaties as void and of no effect.”
38
 
Then, as later, the representatives of the U.S. government rejected outright the concept 
that all Native Americans held their land in common.  The government’s tactic was to divide 
people from each other, win over particular leaders, and make land deals with each of them, 
insisting, on legitimacy of these undertakings.  In 1784, U.S. commissioners met with the 
Iroquois in 1784 at Fort Stanwix, getting them to accept they were a conquered people and 
giving up their claims to the Ohio country (Brant was not present).  A similar tactic was used in 
1785 with the Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas, and Ojibwas. 
The Shawnees were called to Fort Finney at the mouth of the Great Miami River and 
intimidated by the Americans into giving away most of the Ohio country.  Joseph Brant was 
present and stated that “all nations of us of one color were there and agreed as one man not to 
make peace or war without the consent of the whole, and you likewise know that one or two 
nations going to our brothers’ council fire cannot do anything without the whole were there 
present.”
39
  The Native Americans at Fort Finney rejected the American claim that they had been 
defeated in battle and had therefore lost any claim to their land.  Under pressure from the United 
States a group of Shawnee chiefs yielded and gave up most of their claim to present-day eastern 
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and southern Ohio.  Instead of bringing peace, it caused more internal division as the Shawnee 
who were not present prepared for war as Americans continued to move onto their land.  The 
Native Americans were learning that it made no difference if a tribe was at peace or at war with 
the Americans. 
 Even with the British retaining these key posts and supplying presents, the Native 
Americans had to come together to try to stem the tide of American land grabs.  There can be no 
doubt that the ambitious phase of pan-Indianism between 1783 and 1895 was Tecumseh’s 
greatest inspiration.  That was the movement that began in the late summer of 1783 with Joseph 
Brant.  The Mohawk Iroquois leader designed a confederacy that was to be more than a military 
alliance.  The confederacy’s goal was to block American attempts to pit one tribe against another 
in order to buy land.  The confederacy declared that land negotiations made with individual 
tribes were invalid; only the confederacy as a whole could ratify the treaty. 
 America’s appetite for new land could only be satisfied through the demolition of the 
barriers Britain placed in the way of western settlement.  The War Hawks, in particular, had their 
eye focused on expansion.  Those from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio were intent on ending 
what they saw as the Indian menace along the frontier of American settlement.  As a result, they 
detested the alliance between the Native Americans and the British Crown, an alliance of 
convenience to be sure, but an alliance that still stood in the way of the movement of settlers 
onto native lands.
40
   
Native Americans continued to oppose American expansion onto their lands immediately 
following the Revolutionary War.  Britain had held strategic outposts until the spring of 1795.  
The year brought peace to North America when Britain and the United States settled their border 
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dispute.  Wanting peace, the British agreed to evacuate their border forts within two years.  This 
accelerated the crumbling Indian confederation, already weakened by British passivity in 1794 at 
the Battle of Fallen Timbers.
41
  Individual villages now began to seek their separate peace with 
the victorious Americans.
42
 
The dissolution of the confederacy culminated in the Treaty of Greenville in August 
1795.  The Americans dictated terms of the treaty to Ohio area natives.  A primary American 
goal was achieved by dealing with the Shawnees, Miamis, Delawares, and Wyandots as separate 
Indian nations rather than as a unified confederacy.  The treaty forced the Indians to concede the 
southern two-thirds of Ohio and southeastern Indiana.  The Americans also asserted the right to 
build forts wherever they chose within the remaining Indian country.
43
 
The Treaty manifested the Federalist principles of federal supremacy over settlers; a 
defined boundary with the Indian country; payment for Indian lands’ and a federal preemption 
for future purchases from a particular nations (rather than a native confederacy).  By setting 
precedents, the Treaty of Greenville was meant to facilitate later, larger Indian land cessions to 
the United States.  American Secretary of War Timothy Pickering told General Anthony Wayne 
after the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of Greenville that “once a peace is established, 
and we also take possession of the posts now held by the British, we can obtain everything we 
shall want with a tenth part of the trouble and difficulty which you would now have to 
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encounter.”
44
  With the confederated Indians defeated and the British in retreat, the Americans 
took command along their border with Canada. 
The Americans now became very rigid with the Native Americans, much like the British 
immediately following the French and Indian War.  An American commander explained the new 
rules: “Lines are fixed, and so strongly between us [British and Americans], that they cannot be 
mistaken, and every precaution taken to prevent a misunderstanding.”
45
  Native Americans could 
not track British deserters on American soil and chiefs could no longer freely cross the border to 
visit British officials without permission.  More alarming than this was the commander’s 
declaration that the American would cease the British practice of freely feeding Indian visitors 
visiting American forts.  The speech was an assault on three customary Native American rights: 
rewards for deserters, open communication with both powers, and official hospitality for visiting 
chiefs.   
At this time a new generation of Native American leaders was coming to power.  Two 
Shawnee brothers spearheaded the movement to push the Americans back.  Tecumseh and 
Tenskwatawa, The Prophet, would lead a rebellion similar to Pontiac and Neolin, only much 
larger in scope.   
During the 1780s and 1790s, a young Tecumseh, along with his older brother, gained 
much military experience and expertise fighting the American settlers throughout the Ohio River 
Valley.  It was here, along the banks of the Ohio, that Tecumseh gained notoriety among his 
peers.  He was considered to be one of the boldest and fairest warriors in the western territories.  
The Shawnees were impressed by his bravery and skill, and from his success they deduced that 
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his guardian spirits, or sacred power, was strong.  Also, his practice of distributing booty to 
others rather than keeping it himself clearly showed he had the generosity and paternalism 
expected of a chief.
46
  Tecumseh comes to the forefront of Native American fighting during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Although he was not the only Native American 
chief fighting for his freedom and land, he was a major catalyst when discussing the impact of 
the Native Americans on the war effort for both the British and American sides leading up to the 
War of 1812.     
Tecumseh, like Pontiac, benefited from a spiritual movement that allowed him to unite 
various tribes.  His brother, The Prophet, rose to power during the years of 1805 and 1806.  
Before this time, he was not a leader like his brother Tecumseh, rather a drunk who commanded 
little respect from his people.  While Tecumseh preached a message of intertribal unity, the 
Prophet spearheaded a revivalist cult that revitalized Indian culture and values and condemned 
debasing influences form the whites.
47
 He quickly rose to power after having a dream about 
leaving behind all the worldly influences of the whites.  His body shook and trembled when he 
spoke, having a profound impact on his Native American brethren.  He denounced alcohol, the 
abuse of wives and children, war against other Native Americans, and taking more than one 
wife.
48
  If these rules were followed the Natives would ultimately take back their land and defeat 
the settlers moving into their land. 
 This spiritual message allowed Tecumseh to try to unite various tribes, but his efforts to 
create a large-scale pan-Indian resistance to an Anglo-American power is not original.  
Tecumseh was distinguished by the new life he breathed into a strategy that was already tried.  
                                                          
46
 Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life, 63.   
47
 John Sugden, Tecumseh’s Last Stand (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 22. 
48
 Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life, 117. 
25 
 
Efforts to build alliances and confederacies that crossed ethnic divisions among the Indians had 
long been a response to situations of exceptional danger, and such efforts had steadily grown in 
scale.  The Indian world was divided by language, standing intergroup hostilities, and differences 
in outlook.  The logistical obstacles to widespread action alone were formidable.  It is also true 
that the typical native political unit was the village, and that even there authority was 
decentralized and weak.   
The geographic distance among the tribes Tecumseh was trying to unite was another 
problem.  Intertribal ventures often fell apart quickly because of competition between varied 
local priorities, or the jealousies of proud chiefs.  There were simmering intertribal rivalries 
(Ojibwas vs. Dakota Sioux or Potawatomis vs. Osages).
49
  The most difficult problem was the 
language barrier.  The Indians Tecumseh was trying to mold to his purpose were spread in a huge 
arc across the white frontier, stretching from New York in the northeast, sprawling across the 
Great Lakes country and the Midwest, and through the southern states to reach its southeastern 
terminus in Florida.  Working within such diversity Tecumseh faced greater difficulties than 
those of any American or European statesmen, but he would not be deterred.
50
 
Like the chiefs before him, Tecumseh wanted to reconcile his differences with the Americans 
peacefully.  When he visited the British at Fort Malden in 1808 he refused to be brought into an 
alliance, but events unfolded in 1810 that changed his attitude.  There was optimism that the 
grievances he had with the United States could be resolved peacefully.  The major event was that 
changed his mind was the Treaty of Fort Wayne.   
This treaty was part of Governor William Henry Harrison’s strategy to wrest away from 
Native American tribes almost three million acres of land along the Wabash valley in Indiana.  
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His ultimate goal was statehood for Indiana and white settlement was a step towards that goal.  
The Treaty of Fort Wayne had recently been enacted, and like the other treaties in the Northwest 
Territory, it took more land from the Natives.  Governor Harrison invited Tecumseh to 
Vincennes to discuss any grievances he might have.  Tecumseh, along with seventy-five warriors 
took Harrison up on his offer.  While meeting, Tecumseh charged Harrison with trying to sow 
discord among the various tribes.
51
   
The treaty was invalid because land ownership among Native Americans is communal 
and no single tribe has the authority to sign over millions of acres to the United States.  He stated 
to Harrison that he had indeed assembled a great multitude of tribes together to resist further land 
grabs by the United States.  Finally, he stated the Native Americans would resist any attempt to 
settle the lands recently ceded in the Fort Wayne treaty.  Tecumseh did not want war, he wanted 
the United States to return the land, no annuities were necessary for the land.  The Natives would 
live peacefully if more traders were permitted onto their lands for necessary items.
52
 
Harrison could not compromise on the treaty.  Communal ownership of land could not be 
recognized because it would invalidate almost every other treaty signed with any Native 
American tribe and block further land purchases.  Harrison denied treating the Native Americans 
unjustly and dishonestly.  According to reports, at this point in the meeting Tecumseh and his 
warriors rose angrily.  Each side tensely grasped the weapons at their side and waited for the 
other instigate.  Tecumseh, realizing that getting angry did not serve his purpose, apologized 
diplomatically.  Neither side was willing to yield ground and sensed the inevitability of conflict 
on the horizon.  Tecumseh made it clear at his meeting with Harrison that if the United States did 
                                                          
51
 Robert Yagelski, “A Rhetoric of Contact,” 71. 
52
 Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life, 199-200. 
27 
 
not change its policies on the issue of native land, there would be war.  And in the event of war, 
he warned, he would accept gunpowder from the British.
53
 
  Population was another major factor influencing Tecumseh.  In 1810 the population of 
the white settlements in Ohio and the territories of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan amounted to 
270,000.  Against this, the Indian population of the area was little more than 70,000.
54
  
Tecumseh did not have the numbers, but his travels gave him an inkling of the opposition, and 
stimulated his determination to bring in as many tribes as possible and to enlist the help of the 
British.
55
  Years earlier he had discovered an old British wampum belt in possession of the chiefs 
in the region.  It had been given to the King’s Indian allies during the French and Indian War, 
and Tecumseh had retrieved it and kept it safe.  He now brought the belt to Fort Malden to renew 
the old British-Indian alliance.
56
 
Tecumseh was first mentioned in British records in 1808 at a council with senior officials 
of the Indian Department at Amherstburg.  The war chief proposed a military pact with the 
British officials, asserting, “[i]f the king should be in earnest and appear in sufficient force they 
(warriors) would hold fast by him.”
57
 British representatives could only respond by urging 
restraint until the time was right. 
 The Chesapeake affair in 1807 alerted the British to the need to improve their 
relationships with the Native Americans in case they needed their help in a war.
58
  More presents 
began to be issued at the British posts, and the Natives were invited to come to Fort Malden to 
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talks.  The policy of winning Indian favor sped up with the issuance of new instructions from Sir 
James Craig, the governor general of Canada.  British Indian agents were to avoid anything that 
opened Britain to charges that they were inciting the Indians against the United States, but in 
private meetings they could “insinuate” to the chiefs “that as a matter of course we shall look for 
the assistance of our brothers.”  Craig believed that Britain’s new generosity, in increasing the 
issue of supplies, including arms and ammunition, and the difficulties the tribes were having with 
the United States, would eventually push the Indians toward the King, but special efforts should 
be made to win over influential chiefs.
59
 
If the British agents were not openly urging the Natives to take up the hatchet against the 
Americans in 1812, they certainly courted the favor of the tribes.  In July 1811, a Miami chief 
reported to Governor William Henry Harrison that Matthew Elliot, head of the British Indian 
Department, was indeed restraining the warriors, but only until the right moment.  “My son keep 
your eyes fixed on me.  My tomahawk is now up but do not strike until I give the signal.”
60
   
To compound the already uneasy relationship between the British and the Americans, 
British North America boasted its own version of expansionists among its colonial leaders.  For 
them, the impending struggle was to be not one of defense but of reconquest of the Ohio lands to 
which the United States was not truly entitled.  They hoped to reconstitute that region as a Native 
state that would be harmonized with British fur trading interests as a defense buffer against the 
U.S.  The leaders of the North West Company, South West Company (British fur trading 
companies) were at the forefront in demanding the restoration of these lost lands.  The elite of 
the fur-trading community of Montreal stated:  
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[P]osterity will hardly believe, although history must attest the melancholy and 
mortifying truth, that in acceding to the Independence of the Thirteen Colonies as States, 
their territory was not merely allowed to them, but an extent of Country, then a portion of 
the Province of Quebec, nearly of equal magnitude to the said Thirteen Colonies or 
States, was ceded, notwithstanding not a foot of the Country so ceded, was at the time 
occupied by an American in Arms, not could have been had the war continued.
61
  
 
During this volatile time the Native Americans were already drawn into a war with the 
Americans.  In 1811, when Tecumseh was off recruiting for the Confederacy, an American army 
approached Prophetstown.  Harrison wanted to strike a major blow to the growing Indian power 
at Prophetstown (now Tippecanoe), along the banks of the Tippecanoe River in present-day 
Indiana.  Prophetstown, so named after Tecumseh’s brother, was a town that included displaced 
tribes form all over the Northwest.  Native Americans that had been pushed off of their land from 
treaties or white encroachment gathered along the banks of the river in hopes that this inter-tribal 
confederacy could reverse their fortunes.  The town sprang up quickly and Harrison knew that it 
must be squelched before it became too powerful for his militia or threatening for settlers.   
Although present-day history texts, such as The Americans and American Pageant give the 
American forces a decisive victory, nothing could be further from the truth.  Harrison wanted to 
crush the Native American resistance in the Northwest, but Tecumseh was not even present, so it 
would prove to be impossible. The Prophet was placed in charge of the town while Tecumseh 
was recruiting throughout the area.  Tecumseh warned his brother to avoid confrontation because 
they had little gunpowder and needed it to survive the cold season.
62
  His instruction would be 
disregarded. 
The Prophet told the warriors, who were outnumbered two to one, that the bullets of the 
enemies would turn to sand and the braves themselves would be bulletproof.  They were told to 
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attack the American encampment at night because the whites would be blinded, but the warriors 
would be able to see in the dark.  In early morning hours of November 7, 1811 the Native 
Americans made an assault on the American encampment.
63
  The Native Americans gave up 
Prophetstown and the American army plundered each home and destroyed all of the crops stored 
for the winter, but a moral victory could be claimed.  The Natives had far from disgraced 
themselves.  They fought a numerically superior opponent on their chosen ground and inflicted 
heavier casualties than they had suffered.  They proved to Harrison that they were not a people 
that would be intimidated and pushed off of their land without a fight.
64
 
Tecumseh was not really concerned about the British or Canada.  It was the plight of the 
Indian peoples, and his ambition that drove him forward.  The British were tools to be used.  
Their military strength could be harnessed to the Indian Confederacy.  Alone, neither could 
defeat the Americans in North America, but together they could win.  Tecumseh even talked 
about clearing the Americans from all the lands north of the Ohio River.
65
 
Tecumseh was recruiting heavily to push the Americans back off Native lands.  
Tecumseh was determined to establish a confederacy that could launch a native state with full 
rights and recognition of the other states on the continent.
66
  As he was about to launch his war 
against the United States, a larger conflict burst open between the British and the Americans.  
The dream of a joint pan-Indian and British defense of the northwest was becoming a reality.  
The War of 1812 had begun and The British-Native alliance was strengthened by the desperation 
facing both sides during the struggle.   
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Chapter 2 – Necessary Partners 
The Native Americans had been incensed by the Battle of Tippecanoe.  They were being 
dislodged from their land one treaty and battle at a time.  British Indian agents, such as Matthew 
Elliot in the Old Northwest, had been convincing the Native Americans to wait to strike at the 
United States until a formal declaration of war between the two countries had been declared.
67
  
Then the King would supply their needs if they fought on the side of the Crown.  In June of 1812 
the time was right. 
The Native Americans were one of the most important groups to fight during the War of 
1812.  It can be argued that without the Native Americans, Upper Canada, and eventually Lower 
Canada, would have fallen to the United States.  Without the Native Americans as a fighting 
force, the War of 1812 would have taken presumably less than a year to conclude.  Native 
Americans were present at most, but not all of the battles during the War of 1812.  Still, their 
action in the western theater of the war, the action along the Niagara Frontier, and the southern 
portion of the United States made it impossible for the Americans to focus all of their resources 
in one area.  Specific instances will be discussed in which the Native American warriors were the 
determining factor in the outcome of an engagement.  These battles could not have been won by 
the small forces of British regulars and the unproven Canadian militia left to defend Canada 
without the integral Native American support.   
Five major factors must be taken into consideration when describing the key impact the 
Native Americans had on the outcome of the war:  the manpower they provided during the War 
of 1812 was considerable; British commanders were emboldened by the sheer size of Native 
                                                          
67
 Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied: Procter’s War of 1812 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 17. 
32 
 
American forces willing to fight for the Crown; the Native American warriors brought a 
psychological “fear” factor to the war that proved decisive in many instances.  There are 
instances of a particular engagement being won by the British side without firing a shot because 
of the fear the Americans had of Native American warriors.  This fear could be traced to the mid-
eighteenth century during the French and Indian War.
68
  It was seen again during the 
Revolutionary War and in instances when American pioneers encroached further onto Native 
American land.  During the war, Native Americans were able to take control of a situation on 
their own and won without British assistance, again proving their worth.  Native American forces 
were also the driving force behind numerous victories in the Old Northwest, the Niagara 
Frontier, and the southern theater of the war.  British commanders were given credit for the 
victories, but gave credit to the Native Americans for their contributions.   
There were also negative consequences to having Native Americans on the British side.  
In a few instances the Native Americans were expected, did not show, and their absence resulted 
in a British/Canadian loss.  Native Americans did not fight in the same manner as the Euro-
Americans and though tenacious, some of their practices lead to mistrust and conflict with their 
British allies.  The alliance would further be hampered by the deaths of strong leaders on both 
sides that held the fragile alliance together.
69
  First, the Native Americans furnished thousands of 
warriors for the field of battle.  This is important because at the commencement of hostilities 
between Britain and the United States, Britain was already locked in a struggle with Napoleon 
and France.  He wanted to conquer Britain and had already succeeded in taking much of Europe.  
Napoleon was the imminent threat to mainland Britain and the majority of its regular army was 
serving in Europe in order to contain him.  Upper Canada was left with a regular force of 
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approximately 1600 soldiers that were spread along backwoods outposts from Montreal to Lake 
Huron.  There were 11,000 men in the militia that were unarmed, untrained, and unreliable.  
According to General Prevost only four thousand of the men should be armed.
70
  Prevost had the 
daunting task of defending Canada, but the militia could not be counted on for long periods of 
time due to the fact that it was mostly an agrarian society.  The families depended on the men to 
plant and harvest crops at specific times of the year.  Also, many of the families living in Canada 
had relatives in the United States or had moved to Canada from America.  Utilizing the vast 
number of Indian allies was not a question of policy but one of absolute necessity.
71
  British 
commanders had two choices when it came to manpower: abandon Upper Canada or embrace the 
alliance with the Native Americans.
72
 
The number of Native Americans available to the British is disputed.  Tecumseh had 
constructed a loose confederacy of various tribes and various factions of tribes throughout the 
Northwest.  Native American warriors would convene at specific battles when close to their 
lands and some would travel with Tecumseh when they were summoned by the British. Incidents 
at Fort Malden, Detroit, and Fort Michilimackinac provide an example of these forces.  Some 
scholars estimate that 15,000 warriors were available to the British at the onset of hostilities.  
Conservative estimates put the number around 5000-7000.
73
  Still, this force was much larger 
than anything Canada could offer and was a force Americans would have to take seriously.   
One instance in which the number of Native Americans played a role in the outcome of 
an engagement was at Detroit.  America had concluded that the best way to quickly take over 
Canada was a three-pronged attack.  American forces would cross into Canada through Detroit, 
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the Niagara Frontier, and up through Lake Champlain.  If done concurrently, the 
British/Canadian forces would not have the resources to hold on.
74
  The American plan was 
quickly foiled by the British, with major help from the Native Americans on the western front.  
The two major leaders of the British-Indian alliance, Isaac Brock and Tecumseh, would meet and 
become the team that thwarted the American plans in Detroit. 
Fighting tenacity and style were two additional elements of the Native American braves.  
Unlike militia, Native American men had been trained in the art of war from an early age.  They 
might not have been trained with muskets right away, but the guerilla tactics brought into play by 
the Native Americans proved invaluable for the British.  Battles at Beaver Dams, Frenchtown, 
and Prairie du Chien are a small sample of the perseverance shown by the Natives when fighting 
in battle.   
The most important aspect of Native American involvement in the War of 1812 was the 
psychological component.  The war cries and painted faces struck terror in their enemies.
75
  
Americans and Canadians alike knew the destructive and sometimes uncontrollable behavior of 
Native Americans on the field of battle.  History books and newspapers are littered with stories 
of frontier families murdered and scalped, justifiably or not, by Native American warriors.  The 
propensity to give no quarter weighed heavily on the minds of commanding officers and 
residents in areas close to Native American lands.  British officials would use this psychological 
advantage more than once during the war.  One Detroit resident wrote to Congress in February of 
1812 stating that “a war with England has no terrors compared with those arising from their 
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savage allies.”
76
 The massacres at Fort Dearborn, Frenchtown, and Fort Mims made headlines 
across America and Canada.  These events caused panic and despair among frontier Americans. 
Settlers fled from their homes and militias fled from the field of battle.  American generals had to 
decide if they wanted to risk entire regiments being butchered by Natives or capitulate peacefully 
to the commanding British officer.  Sometimes it did not matter what they chose.  British 
commanders, such as Isaac Brock, impressed with Native American valor on the field of battle 
would no longer defend Canada, but push for and achieve an invasion of America.
77
 
The first instance in which Native American numbers played a role in the war was at Fort 
Michilimackinac.  Mackinaw Island was of strategic importance during the War of 1812.  
Originally a British fort during the Revolutionary War it was transferred to American hands 
fifteen years later.  The British coveted the tiny island at the outset of the War of 1812 for a 
number of reasons.  The fort on the island controlled the strategic waterway connecting Lake 
Huron and Lake Superior.  Whoever controlled this waterway would control the lucrative fur 
trade and the western tribes. 
 The British commander, Charles Roberts, who was in charge of nearby Fort Joseph (the 
most westerly post of the British Empire), was given discretion by his superior, Isaac Brock to 
launch an attack against the American fortress.  Roberts, like Brock, believed he could not 
withstand an American assault on his position and decided that the best defense was a good 
offense.
78
  With only fifty regular troops under his command, Roberts needed warriors.  Native 
Americans in the area were happy to oblige.  Noted fur trader Alexander Mackenzie listened as 
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Americans told the Indians that they kept this country by “right of conquest.”
79
 Roberts gathered 
a force of Native Americans consisting of several different tribes.  There were 300 Ottawa 
present and approximately 110 Sioux, Menominee, and Winnebago warriors from Wisconsin.
80
 
 The British force arrived at Mackinac Island under the cover of darkness and quickly 
climbed an escarpment undetected, overlooking the American fort commanded by Porter Hanks.  
The American commander only had 61 men at his disposal when he saw mostly Native warriors 
peering down on his garrison.  Already at a disadvantage strategically and numerically the 
American commander made his decision.  Fearing the destruction of his men by the Native 
Americans, Porter surrendered the fort without firing a shot.  Roberts, believing the right 
decision was made, allowed the Americans to leave with full honors of war.  John Askin, a fur 
trader accompanying the British force believed that if a shot had been fired, not a single 
American soldier would have been saved from the fury of the Indians.
81
  The British commanded 
respect from their Native allies, but it was the Native Americans that made up a majority of this 
fighting force. 
 One of the first major conflicts during the War of 1812 was won not by the British, but 
by a British force overwhelmingly comprised of Native Americans from the Old Northwest.  The 
acquisition of this strategic island pushed the allegiance of many of the neutral western tribes to 
the British.
82
  The number of warriors would swell the British ranks and make the defense of 
Canada seem possible.   
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As previously stated, the British/Native victory would convince neutral tribes to join the 
British side. The growing number of Native Americans joining the British war effort would also 
play a part in the decision of American General William Hull to abandon his invasion of Canada 
and surrender Detroit without a fight.  He knew that the shipping lanes on the Great Lakes were 
cut off and the Natives were free to attack supply trains on the muddy trails that weaved through 
the American backcountry.
83
 
At first, General Hull marched unopposed from Detroit across to Canada and occupied 
the small village of Sandwich.  The Canadian militia was away tending to the harvest and there 
were not enough British regulars to be sent out to meet the force, but Tecumseh had already been 
active in the defense of Canada.  He led his contingency in the general harassment of Hull’s 
force when he crossed into Canada.  Amherstburg was a Canadian town a few miles south of 
Detroit and British Fort Malden was constructed at the north end of the town.  Fort Malden is 
where Tecumseh, along with his friends Roundhead and Main Poc, would gather the Native 
force of about 350 warriors to prepare for battle.
84
   
Hull had it in his power to crush Fort Malden and threaten Canada from the rear due to 
the massive size of his force.  He had the veterans from Tippecanoe (about 1000 men) and a 
force of 1200 Ohio militia at his disposal.  On July 12, 1812, when General Hull crossed into 
Canada and took the small town of Sandwich, he was met with no resistance and hoisted the 
American flag for the first time on Canadian soil.
85
  The following day the importance of the 
Indians was indirectly referenced in a proclamation given to Canadians by Hull.  He stated his 
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intentions to free the Canadians from the oppression of the British and that they should stay 
home and not fight alongside the Native Americans.  He declared:  
If the barbarous and Savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages are let 
loose to murder our Citizens and butcher our women and children, this will be a war of 
extermination.  The first stroke with the Tomahawk the first with the scalping Knife will 
be the signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation, No White man found fighting by 
the side of an Indian will be taken prisoner.  Instant destruction will be his lot.
86
   
 
Hull knew of the destructive power of the Native Americans and was very cautious about 
marching his force the fifteen miles south to Fort Malden.  Tecumseh would prove the valor of 
the Natives while skirmishing multiple times with the Americans on their way to Fort Malden.  
Tecumseh had to be the protective force because many of the Canadian militia deserted - their 
numbers dwindled to less than four hundred at Fort Malden.
87
  Brock was expecting an attack 
along the Niagara frontier at any time and could not spare any more British troops at the far 
reaches of the province.  Never had the British needed Tecumseh more desperately.  Mathew 
Elliot wrote that “the Indians with us are between three and four hundred, who have resisted 
every allurement which General Hull laid before them.  Tech-kum-thai has kept them faithful.  
He has shown himself to be a determined character and a great friend to our government.”
88
  The 
leader necessary to protect the far reaching parts of the British Empire was not even British, he 
was Native American. 
 General Hull sent portions of his forces south towards Fort Malden on three separate 
occasions.  About half way to the fort, a stream, the Aux Canard, made crossing difficult.  There 
was only one small bridge and only a few men could cross at a time.  The British leader at Fort 
Malden, Thomas St. George, realized the eagerness of his Indian allies, but did not have the 
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forces to support them.  After a few days, he realized he would have to support the Indians where 
he could and loosed Tecumseh upon the oncoming invaders.
89
 Tecumseh realized his 
geographical advantage and took to harassing and gathering intelligence about the enemy forces.   
On July 16, July 19 and July 25 Tecumseh and his raiding parties were able to repulse 
American advances towards Fort Malden.  Most of the time the numerical threat of the Natives 
was enough to force back the American contingent, but on July 25 the Americans suffered their 
first battle fatalities.  Tecumseh led a party that crossed over the Aux Canard and ambushed a 
party of 120 Ohio volunteers.  The skirmishes proved the power of the Native forces and gave 
Tecumseh and his alliance confidence.  Hull believed the Indians were now surrounding him on 
all sides and were merciless in the heat of battle.  Now on Canadian soil, Hull was hesitant to 
attack and constantly worried about his supply lines being cut off by the Native Americans.
90
  
The number of Native Americans was now determining the action of the American forces.   
 The halt of the American army convinced more neutral tribes to join Tecumseh’s loose 
Native American confederacy.  The powerful Wyandot tribe defected to the British side and 
brought hundreds more warriors.
91
  They were also camped south of Detroit, allowing Tecumseh 
to cut off Hull’s line of communication with the rest of America.  Tecumseh took the opportunity 
and crossed over to American soil.  It was at Brownstown, a town south of Detroit, that one of 
Tecumseh’s daring raids would take place.  He ambushed a force of Americans four times larger 
than his own while they were trying to take supplies to Detroit.  Besides defeating a numerically 
superior force, the Native Americans captured General Hull’s mail.  Native American warriors 
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were now joining Tecumseh’s alliance en mass; his ranks had swollen to six hundred men.
92
  
News that the American invasion at Niagara had stalled and British General Isaac Brock was on 
his way to Fort Malden sent Hull reeling.
93
  The invasion of Canada had ended, for the time 
being. 
  Brock and Tecumseh met for the first time on the night August 15th.  It was late and the 
meeting was short, but both men had quickly developed a mutual respect for one another.  Brock 
admired the courage shown by his counterpart and Tecumseh faced a man that had the same 
daring spirit. Brock hatched a bold plan, against the wishes of his superior officer (Prevost), to 
attack Detroit.
94
  
This bold plan was hatched towards the end of 1811 when British officers in Canada 
knew a conflict was coming.  Brock brooded long and hard about the military strategy to be 
pursued in the likely event of war with the United States.  His strategy differed from that of the 
other British military commanders in the Canadas, because he understood that an effective 
alliance with native peoples would hold the key to the defense of Upper Canada’s western 
reaches.  This idea would be central to his triumphs in the last months of his life and it would be 
put into action at Detroit.   
The plan was bold because Brock knew the size of the force Hull had at Detroit from the 
captured mail, but he also knew of Hull’s fear of the Native American warriors.  He immediately 
sent a letter to Hull imploring him to surrender Fort Detroit. Brock stated that “the numerous 
body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond control the moment 
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the contest commences.”
95
  In reality the British had attached themselves to the body of Indians 
for the battle.  Brock gambled on Detroit with the presence of the Native Americans.   
 Hull refused the offer, so Brock marched across the Detroit River and prepared for the 
assault.  The Native Americans employed another tactical maneuver.  Tecumseh, after all the 
warriors had made it across the river, infiltrated the town of Detroit and marched his warriors 
through the woods so they could be seen by the defenders.  After the warriors formed lines he 
would send some of the braves back through the woods to make it appear as though there were at 
least two to three thousand warriors.  He made sure that from Detroit, the men could see his 
ranks swelling with braves.
96
  This seems to have been the decisive action in the “battle.”  
William Hull surrendered the Detroit before any fighting took place.  Hull later testified at his 
court-martial hearing that he was influenced to surrender by the news that the Indians were 
breaching the outskirts of the town.
97
  It is possible that he wanted to spare the town and his 
family from a massacre.  Detroit is another early example of the numeric advantage the Native 
Americans would afford the British in military conflict.  The number of Native Americans had 
contributed greatly in saving Upper Canada from invasion through Detroit and proved their value 
to the British Empire.  
 It is necessary to explore the relationship between Tecumseh and Brock in greater detail.  
What made the two such natural allies was their approach to combat.  Both were inclined to fight 
offensive battles, to strike quickly, and to cede as little ground as possible to the enemy.  
Realizing that when the Americans mobilized to their full capacity they would outnumber the 
native warriors, British regulars, and Canadian militia, they counted on a war of movement.  The 
                                                          
95
 Brock to Hull, 15 August 1812, Cruikshank 144. 
96
 Wood, Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, 554. 
97
 Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life, 303. 
42 
 
British-Indian alliance would use swift attacks which would disrupt the enemy, endanger his 
lines of supply and communication, and prevent him from assembling his superior numbers on a 
field of battle where he could achieve strategic victory.  Brock’s regular army, with the cannons, 
was an ideal match for Tecumseh’s warriors, who were much more comfortable using their 
guerilla tactics.  They relied on an excellent knowledge of the terrain and ability to strike quickly 
at chosen points.
98
   
 In General Brock, Tecumseh had at last found a man worthy of his trust, and during the 
few days they had together the Shawnee made sure the English officer learned why the Indians 
were fighting.  Brock knew the folly of promising more than he could deliver, but he was under a 
deep obligation to the Indians; he sympathized with their predicament; and more than anything 
else, he had further need of their services.  He had to keep Tecumseh’s hopes alive.  He pledged 
that this time the Indians would not be deserted.
99
 
 Brock was still threatened by invasion at Niagara and only spent a day or so at Fort 
Malden before returning east, but on August 29 he addressed a letter to the new British Prime 
Minister, Lord Liverpool. 
Among the Indians whom I met at Amherstburg, and who had arrived from distant parts 
of the country, I found some extraordinary characters.  He who attracted most of my 
attention was a Shawnee chief, Tecumset, brother to the Prophet, who for the last two 
years has carried on, contrary to our remonstrances, an active warfare against the United 
States.  A more sagacious or more gallant warrior does not, I believe, exist.  He was the 
admiration of every one who conversed with him.  From a life of dissipation he has not 
only become, in every respect, abstemious, but has likewise prevailed on all his nation 
and many of the other tribes to follow his example.  They appear determined to continue 
the contest until they obtain the Ohio for a boundary.  The United States government is 
accused, and I believe justly, of having corrupted a few dissolute characters whom they 
pretended to consider as chiefs, and with whom they contracted engagements and 
concluded treaties, which they have attempted to impose on the whole Indian race.
100
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The Indians were of utmost importance to Canadian security, and Brock suggested Liverpool 
could ensure their loyalty by including them “in any future negotiations for peace.”  To Sir 
George Prevost, governor-general of Canada, he was more pointed still.  The Indians would not 
fight for Britain unless their interests, or war aims, became part of peace negotiations; a treaty, 
he said, should admit their claims “to an extensive tract of country, fraudulently usurped from 
them.”
101
  
 It is not know for sure what exactly was said between Tecumseh and Brock.  We know 
that on September 17 Brock instructed General Procter to have British-Indian agent Thomas 
McKee raised the matter with the Indians, in a casual fashion, and learned what the tribes would 
want in a peace, both in the event of British success and of British failure in the war.
102
  There 
can be little doubt that Brock assured Tecumseh that Indian land claims would be supported, but 
equally that he had not entered into the detail of the subject.
103
 
Brock would be killed at the Battle of Queenston Heights two months after the meeting 
with Tecumseh and great victory at Detroit.  Tecumseh would not get to fight alongside the man 
that gave him so much respect again.  Britain had lost one of its ablest commanders and the 
Native Americans had lost one of their most ardent supporters.  Henry Procter would now take 
over British operations and work with Tecumseh, but it would not be the same. 
Native Americans also contributed to the war effort by leading their own expeditions 
against the Americans without British help.  These expeditions proved Native Americans were 
capable of defeating the Americans on their own and were a valuable military asset to the 
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British.  The Battle of Beaver Dams and the victory by the Creeks at Fort Mims were two 
important examples of Native Americans winning decisive victories on their own. 
 The Native Americans proved their worth to the British throughout the war effort, but it 
was a force consisting mainly of Native Americans that managed to win a decisive victory at the 
Battle of Beaver Dams.  This decisive action would come on the Niagara Frontier.  The 
Americans had taken possession of Fort George on the Canadian side of the Niagara River.  
Although the American troops still outnumbered the British by two to one, the hunters had 
become the hunted.
104
   
Dreading the forest full of Indians and the roads clogged with mud, the Americans waited 
for their side to gain control of Lake Ontario before moving.  Desperate for provisions, but not 
wanting to give up Fort George, the American General Henry Dearborn sent out scouting parties 
to plunder the farms and mills within a dozen miles of the fort.  These foraging parties 
increasingly fell into ambushes set by the British and their Indian allies.
105
  An American officer 
recalled that each probe found “the limits of safe marching more and more contracted.”
106
  The 
guerilla tactics frustrated Dearborn and he sent Lieutenant Colonel John G. Boerstler with a force 
of 575 infantry and cavalry to crush these skirmishers and probe the British lines for 
weakness.
107
 
 The important facet of the battle was its participants.  Lieutenant James Fitzgibbon was 
the commander of 50 British Rangers at a small post on the Niagara Frontier.  There were 
approximately 400 Native warriors that carried out the attack on Boerstler’s force.     
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 The American commander saw Native Americans as he marched his forces into the 
woods on June 24, 1813, but did not retreat back to Fort George.  The Native American force, 
comprised of 300 Caughnawaga and 100 Mohawks under the command of John Norton, attacked 
in a densely wooded area right outside Beaver Dams (Thorold, Ontario).  The position was 
perfect for the guerilla style of the Natives, but disastrous for the Americans, as they could not 
see the targets they were firing at.  After two hours of taking heavy fire and Boerstler himself 
being wounded, the Americans were ready to surrender.  The main reason was for surrendering 
was the fear of being massacred by the Natives.
108
  
According to Fitzgibbon, the surrender was made possible because of the strength shown 
by the Native force against the Americans.
109
  Fitzgibbon later stated “not a shot was fired on our 
side by any but the Indians.  They beat the American detachment into a state of terror, and the 
only share I claim is taking advantage of a favorable moment to off the protection from the 
tomahawk and the scalping knife.”
110
  Fitzgibbon intimidated Boerstler into surrendering with a 
note about the strength of the Native Americans surrounding his unit.  He stated that the 
Americans must surrender to avoid a general massacre by the Indians.  Finally, after another 
small British detachment arrived Boerstler yielded his entire force.
111
  Chief John Norton stated 
that, “The Caughnawaga got the victory, the Mohawks got the plunder and Fitzgibbon got the 
credit.”
112
   
 The Battle at Fort Mims was another instance in which Native American forces routed an 
American counterpart on their own.  The southern theater of the War of 1812 is often 
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overlooked, but cannot be neglected.  While the war in the north proved to be a back and forth 
struggle a new development in the southern United States would leave the US vulnerable to 
attack on two geographical fronts.  The young nation would now have to divert precious 
resources to the south during an increasingly unpopular war.
113
   
The Creek Nation was divided among the Upper and Lower Creeks.  The Lower Creek 
Nation had adopted some European customs and agrarian lifestyles.  This angered the Upper 
Creeks who strongly resented the encroachments American settlers had made with a road cut 
through their territory.  The Creek Indians saw a civil war erupt among the tribe that spilled into 
the greater conflict of the War of 1812 against the Americans.  The warriors of the Upper Creek 
most closely aligned with Tecumseh’s dream of an Indian confederation were called Red Sticks, 
probably named for the color of their Creek war clubs.
114
 
 Many Americans believed that the British and the Spanish were inciting the Indians in the 
South by handing out weapons.
115
  Tempers flared when Americans learned that a group of 
Native Americans were returning to their villages from Pensacola loaded with ammunition and 
guns from the Spanish.  The Americans engaged the Creeks and a small skirmish ensued.  This 
encounter came to be called the Battle of Burnt Corn and proved to be the opening round of the 
Creek War, a war that was as much Creek versus Creek as it was American versus Creek, 
Spanish, and British.
116
  Although an indecisive battle, it gave the Native Americans confidence.  
The Red Sticks determined to drive the white settlers out of their territory and starting with an 
attack on Fort Mims. 
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 After the Battle of Burnt Corn many settlers sought refuge at Fort Mims.  The fear of the 
Natives spread and the entire Mississippi Territorial Militia was called out for greater 
protection.
117
  The Fort was one of the strongest and largest in the area, and no one seriously 
believed the Indians would attack such a strong position.
118
  At the time of the attack there were 
120 militia stationed at the fort.  All together there were probably around 275 whites and a 
number of slaves, all able to offer some resistance.
119
  Resistance would prove to be futile in this 
encounter.   
The Upper Creeks were led by William Weatherford, a man born to a Scottish father and 
Creek mother.  The night before the attack, Weatherford led a small group of Natives on a 
reconnaissance mission to the fort.  It was determined the Natives would rush through the fort’s 
open gate and then take control of the portholes on the sides of the fort.  The portholes would 
offer the warriors protection if the element of surprise failed.  The next day the Indians executed 
their offensive.  After nearly three hours of fighting nearly all of the 300 occupants of Fort Mims 
were dead.   
News of the massacre spread quickly across the frontier.  No fort in the south of this size 
and strength had ever been captured by the Indians.  Many of the settlers believed that the 
Indians had magical powers.
120
  At about the same time, the Red Sticks made a number of 
smaller, but successful attacks against other forts and settlements that resulted in American 
casualties.  The attacks were repulsed, but they did add considerably to the general state of alarm 
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and increased the credibility of the rumors of widespread attack and destruction.
121
  The Native 
Americans in the southeast had become an immediate threat to the young nation on their own. 
Another example of the Native Americans acting with nominal British assistance was at 
Prairie du Chien and Rock Island Rapids in the far western theater.  The upper Mississippi was 
of vital importance to the British fur trade.  The British already controlled strategic 
Michilimackinac, but wanted to keep control of the Mississippi waterway.  Prairie du Chien was 
an outback fur trading post located at the confluence of the Wisconsin and Mississippi River.  
The waterway was significant because it connected the mighty Mississippi with the Great Lakes.  
It was also invaluable to British Indian agents engendering the military alliance of the Natives.
122
  
The problem was an American force under William Clark took the area on June 2, 1814 
and renamed it Fort Shelby.  A British commander at Michilimackinac noted that if the enemy 
was not ousted from the post, “there was an end to our connection with the Indians…. Tribe after 
tribe would be gained over or subdued, & thus would be destroyed the barrier which protects the 
great trading establishments of the North West & Hudson Bay Companies.”
123
   
The British, under the command of William McKay, set out to retake the area because 
native peoples to Prairie du Chien held the British alliance in high regard.  McKay had a force 
numbering approximately 600 men, with half being warriors from the Menominee and Chippewa 
tribes.
124
  Upon arriving at Fort Shelby, the British and Native Allies surrounded the fort.  
American Lieutenant Perkins, after taking continuous cannon fire for two days weighed his 
options.  He was running low on ammunition, medical supplies, water, had an inferior force, and 
was cut off from the river (his escape route).  He surrendered and appealed to the mercy of the 
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British officers.  In any combat with Indians in this region, brutality could become apparent.  
Fear of the Native Americans was again a major factor in the American surrender. 
When McKay accepted the truce he warned the Americans not to come out of the fort 
until the following morning.  As he told Perkins, he could not guarantee the safe passage of the 
Americans in the face of possible Indian reprisal.
125
  The Indians allowed for safe passage and 
the Americans were granted parole and allowed to return to St. Louis.  During the siege of Fort 
Shelby the Americans cut a gunboat loose to drift downriver because it was taking heavy fire.  
McKay sent a party of Indians, with four kegs of powder, downstream to destroy the structure.  
The Battle of Rock River Rapids would occur two days after the surrender of Fort Shelby. 
On July 21 the Indians discovered six American barges anchored for the night with the 
intent of relieving Perkins at Fort Shelby.  The Indians fell upon the anchored barges with a fury 
that can only be imagined.  At Rock River Rapids the Indians were complete with their stroke.
126
  
McKay learned of the fighting and got the details of the native martial technique:  
To give an idea how desperate the Indians were, the women even jumped on board with 
their Hoes,  some breaking heads, others breaking casks, some trying to cut holes in her 
bottom and sink her, and others setting fires to the decks—as one of the barges was 
making from shore the Ioway that came from McKinac with me, jumped on her deck and 
with his hatchet cut a hole, and fired his gun among the Americans in the boat—they 
plunged into the river and made his escape ashore.
127
      
 
This evidence from July 1814 proves that the Native Americans were still fighting and 
desperately trying to preserve their way of life.  The western tribes cannot be trivialized in the 
War of 1812 and because they allowed the British to maintain a presence along the Mississippi 
River.  McKay reported to his superiors that Rock Island rapids “…is perhaps one of the most 
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brilliant actions fought by Indians only, since the commencement of the war.”
128
  British 
commanders still viewed the Native American fighting force as necessary in the War of 1812. 
The most important military contribution the Native Americans provided the British 
during the War of 1812 was the psychological “fear” factor they created in the minds of their 
adversaries.  The fear created was an advantage in numbers too.  You may rely on it that without 
the Indians we never could keep this country and that with them [on the British side] the 
Americans never will take the upper posts, . . .for in the woods, where the Americans must pass, 
one Indian is equal to three white men.
129
   
In many instances, Native Americans were involved in a specific conflict during the war 
and an American commander would readily surrender rather than risk his entire force being 
killed by Native Americans.  There are cases in which Native Americans attacked American 
forces and left few survivors.  The Native mode of warfare, including scalping and killing 
wounded soldiers terrified the American public.  It also forced many American leaders to 
surrender rather than fight. 
A famous incident took place in May, 1813.  A British naval officer out on Lake Ontario 
watched a boat full of American troops rowing out from shore under a white flag.  The officer 
stated they came to “surrender and claim our protection as prisoners of war against the savages 
on the shore.”  The officer was astonished because he noted that the Americans were “armed to 
the teeth” with weapons.  The American officer stated “that the woods were full of Indians, that 
he had had a fight with that morning; and rather than fall into their hands and be massacred, he 
surrendered to us.”  Minutes later a second boat of Americans followed to complete the surrender 
of 115 well-armed Americans, who had suffered only light casualties skirmishing with thirty-six 
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warriors.
130
  This is one of many examples of American soldiers panicking when facing a group 
of Native Americans. 
To explain the surrendering of Americans that day, the British officer cited an American 
culture that was paralyzed by horror stories featuring Indians.  “The dread of encounter with 
Indian foes was a striking feature among many of the Americans. . . To the effect of nursery tales 
and fireside legends, aided by ‘thrilling narratives’ issuing from a mercenary press, the 
Americans are most indebted for this weakness.”
131
  A New Yorker confirmed that no child was 
“allowed to grow up in that region, without imbibing . . . hatred and horror of the Indians.  Tales 
of Indian cruelties were in the mouths of all mothers and nurses.”
132
  Americans were taught 
from birth to fear and hate Native Americans.    
The British valued Native warriors because they scared American regulars and terrified 
American militia.  A British agent said, “The Americans are constantly in Alarm either by an 
Indian War or at least the shadow of Bands of Indians.  They imagine their heads in danger of 
being scalped.”
133
  The fighting style was different and Americans feared Native American 
scalping.  An American official confirmed this fear by stating, “A war with England has no 
terrors compared with those arising from their savage allies.”
134
  Most of this fear came from the 
prowess of Native Americans in guerilla combat.  The use of sudden raids and ambushes tricked 
American forces into thinking there were more Natives present at an engagement than there 
really were.  (This can be seen, for example, at Detroit.  General Brock played on Hull’s fear of 
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the native warriors.)  The silence in the woods followed by sudden shrieks scared even the most 
hardened military veterans. 
In addition to the fighting style of the Natives, their customs of war also terrified the 
Americans.  By scalping the dead, warriors took trophies of victory and dishonored the enemy.  
Even though Americans scalped too, the Native Americans were vilified for doing it.  Sometimes 
warriors would mutilate corpses to make a terrifying impression on those who would discover 
them.  One example occurred in Indiana in 1812.  An American soldier found a frontier family 
“cut up with a tomahawk and a knife.  The man had his breast opened, his entrails torn out and 
strewed about the ground.”  These displays often spooked entire settlements into flight.  These 
panics were more common than heroic acts of home defense so often celebrated in patriotic 
histories of the settler frontier.
135
  The settler retreat was exactly what the Natives wanted and 
their mode of warfare was working. 
Americans would lump all native peoples together as brutal savages.  Dread and hatred 
were alternating emotional currents affecting the same people depending on the circumstances.  
When given superior numbers over vulnerable natives, Americans would butcher natives of all 
ages and both genders, which they would call just revenge.
136
  Fear trumped hatred when 
Americans ventured into a densely forested country possessed by Indians who had British help.  
In forest combat, American troops confronted their own nightmares, something far more terrible 
than real Indians.  An American soldier’s greatest fear lurked in his own vivid imagination.
137
  
Native Americans psychologically weakened America.   
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The British were caught in a difficult situation.  Although natives and American soldiers 
both scalped the dead, killed prisoners, and plundered civilians, the difference was Americans 
had access to printing presses to spread their stories.  Propaganda was a powerful tool the 
Americans utilized during the war.  This propaganda embarrassed British officers, who 
considered themselves civilized.
138
  
As American defeats mounted, so did American frustration.  The Baltimore Whig 
suggested, “Hang four or five Indians for every American massacred, and if it does not bring 
them to their senses it will at least go some way towards their extermination.”
139
  A double 
standard is seen here.  Although the Americans were fighting the British and the Native 
Americans, there is not a headline to be found calling for the extermination of the British.  The 
natives are being supplied by the British with weapons, ammunition, and food, but Americans 
are focused on wiping out the Native Americans.  The Aurora concluded, “The hand of 
vengeance must be raised against them, and a war of extermination waged until they shall 
disappear from the borders of our extensive country.”
140
  This negative attitude foreshadows 
what little respect would be given to Native Americans when the War of 1812 concluded. 
American propaganda labeled the natives as bloodthirsty savages, but also denounced the 
British for manipulating bloodthirsty savages.  American congressman Henry Clay talked about 
the innocence of the Canadians in this manner: 
Canada innocent? Canada unoffending? Is it not in Canada that the tomahawk of the 
savage had been moulded into its death-like form?  Has it not been from Canadian 
magazines, Malden and others, that those supplies have been issued?  Supplies which 
have enabled the savage hordes to butcher the garrison of Chicago and to commit other 
horrid murders?
141
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Even American President James Madison lost his temper when discussing the British alliance 
with the Native Americans.  In 1813 he assured Congress that the British were “eager to glut 
their savage thirst with the blood of the vanquished, and to finish the work of torture and death 
on the maimed and defenceless captives.”
142
  Americans praised their own refusal to use Native 
Americans while accusing the British of buying scalps for six dollars each.
143
 Ironically, some 
Native tribes were aligned with American at this time and the same tactics denounced by 
Americans were used against the British. 
 The propaganda war against the natives also opened up the door to American military 
recruiting, putting the British at an even greater disadvantage.  The battle at Frenchtown and 
subsequent events became a rallying cry for the Americans throughout the rest of the war.  After 
winning an engagement near Frenchtown (settlement south of Detroit) British General Henry 
Procter did not have enough supplies to take the wounded American soldiers with him back to 
Detroit.  During the evening, many of these soldiers were killed by Native Americans.  
“Remember the River Raisin” was a call to arms and a call to remember American fallen soldiers 
at Frenchtown.
144
  
In their defense, the British asserted that the natives had every right to defend their own 
lands in their own way against American aggression.  The British also insisted that they did 
everything in within their power to moderate the Indian mode of war.  The British stated the 
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Crown only paid for captives, which encouraged the warriors to spare lives.
145
  The American 
propaganda war machine embarrassed the British-Native alliance.
146
   
In the field of battle, British commanders coveted the ability of natives to harass the 
flanks of American armies and to turn their retreats into bloody routs or sudden surrenders.
147
  
There was a double standard in the military action of the war too.  Native Americans would be 
looked down upon by some British commanders and actually forced military action upon British 
commanders when they knew it was not the right decision.  According to some British 
commanders, Native Americans were unruly, uncontrollable, and could not be trusted in the heat 
of battle.
148
   
As previously stated, Henry Procter was left in command of the British forces in the west.  
He was short on men and supplies, but his appeal for more of both went unanswered.  He lacked 
supplies not only for his men, but also for the natives.  Always ambivalent about natives, Procter 
respected and feared Tecumseh.
149
  Though he distrusted their loyalty, he failed to recognize that 
the confederacy did not have the same war aims as the British; his lack of troops required him to 
rely on them as allies.
150
  
Native Americans were becoming more of a burden to the British as the war continued.
151
  
They would often leave a battle to return home or would not listen to British commanding 
officers.  The number of Natives also dependent on British gifts of food and clothing was also 
becoming unsustainable.
152
  The British/Canadian forces were having a difficult time even 
                                                          
145
 Ibid., 208. 
146
 Antal, A Wampum Denied, 200. 
147
 Antal, A Wampum Denied, 177. 
148
 Ibid., 195. 
149
 Zuehlke, For Honour’s Sake, 197. 
150
 Pierre Burton, The Invasion of Canada:1812-1813 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), 282-83. 
151
 Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 196-214. 
152
 Procter to Prevost, July 11, 1813, in Select British Documents, 2: 254. 
56 
 
getting supplies to the outer reaches of Upper Canada, let alone supplying multiple tribes with 
enough food to survive. 
After the defeat at Detroit, William Henry Harrison was ordered to recapture the lost 
territory.  His plan was to construct a string of forts along the Sandusky River through Ohio.  In 
this way, he could protect his supply lines through inhospitable areas.  Procter, although short on 
supplies, knew he must stop him before the Americans became entrenched in the heart of Indian 
country.  A string of forts would serve to demoralize the natives and strain the British/ Native 
alliance.
153
  The first problem Procter faced with the natives was a lack of response.  On April 3, 
1813, Procter sent word to Tecumseh, asking him to join the attack, but six days later he still did 
not have a reply.
154
  On April 16, Tecumseh and his brother arrived with about a dozen warriors.  
He asked Procter to wait an additional five days for the arrival of four hundred braves.  Procter 
needed the manpower and was forced to wait, but the almost month-long delay allowed Harrison 
to strengthen the newly constructed Fort Meigs.  The episode shows an example of a growing 
lack of communication between the allies or it might indicate how meager overall resources were 
for both the British and Tecumseh’s Confederacy. 
An example of the Natives abandoning British forces also took place at the first siege of 
Fort Meigs.  Attracting more natives to the British cause was both advantageous and 
disadvantageous for the British.  Many western tribes arrived at Detroit a few weeks after the 
great victory.  They were western tribes who had not been directly affected by American 
encroachment yet and had never seen an American.  British Indian agents had given them some 
supplies due to an extended drought in their region.  Now they followed the agents back to 
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Detroit ready to fight, but expecting further provisions for their families.
155
  The Native coalition 
now consisted of more than three thousand warriors, outnumbering the British regulars six to 
one.  The British could never prevail on the frontier without Indian support, but their support 
came at a price.  Procter had to be the aggressor in order to keep the Native Americans involved.  
Only through offensive action could they regain the lands stolen by the Americans through war 
and deceit.
156
  Procter was forced to use the new arrivals immediately or risk losing them.  Due 
to the shortage of supplies, Procter wanted to attack a supply depot on the Upper Sandusky 
River, but the warriors had other ideas. 
Procter wrote, “I had the mortification to find instead of the Indian force being a 
disposable one, or under my direction, our movements should be subject to the caprices and 
prejudices of the Indian body, to the degree in which my regular force was disproportionate to 
their numbers.”
157
  Native Americans were forcing the British to fight in places where they did 
not see an advantage and in circumstances when there was a disagreement in leadership.  The 
Native warriors were always going to follow the leadership of Tecumseh.  Again, once Brock 
died, the British/Native alliance existed but did not prosper. 
Procter agreed to attack Fort Meigs.  The allies marched towards the American 
fortifications and scored a tactical victory outside of the fort by destroying a column of American 
reinforcements trying to get inside the fort.  The victory did not end up with the capturing of the 
fort though.  After capturing over 400 American soldiers, Native Americans began tomahawking 
the helpless men.  British officers were helpless amongst their native allies.  At this point, a 
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British soldier was killed when he tried to intervene and stop the killing of prisoners.
158
  
Tecumseh arrived and threatened to kill any warrior who continued to murder prisoners.  After 
the capture of this large number of troops, many warriors departed, heading home to deliver 
captured goods.  Procter could not continue the siege without the main body of his force and was 
forced to retreat to Amherstberg before the Americans could pick up on his weakness.
159
  On top 
of this, his superior (Prevost) had not wanted him making incursions into American territory 
anyways. 
During the summer of 1813, the British were also in a tenuous position along the Niagara 
frontier.  The Americans held Fort George on the Canadian side of the Niagara River, but each 
side was waiting to move further until control over Lake Ontario was established.  The British 
relied on their Indian allies to keep the Americans pinned within Fort George and to keep British 
soldiers and Upper Canadian settlers from deserting.
160
  The reliance proved double-edged, for 
the warriors demanded that the British keep a substantial army on the Niagara Peninsula, a 
dangerously exposed position should the Americans gain naval control of the lake.
161
  British 
officer Edward Baynes explained that a withdrawal “would have lost us all our wavering friends 
and would have proved destructive to our Indian alliance.”
162
  British officers making decisions 
to keep the Native Alliance together was not necessarily the best military tactic for the war.  This 
is where conflicting war aims prevented the alliance from operating smoothly.  The British were 
stretched to the limits at home dealing with Napoleon and were now being forced to use their 
scant resources to protect an alliance they needed in order to defend Canada. 
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Even with the destruction of another American military force, Procter did not achieve his 
goal of dislodging the Americans from Ohio.  It had been at best a long shot and it had a visible 
effect on the local tribes.  Many came forward to the Americans, including local chiefs of the 
Delaware, Seneca, and Shawnee, to offer surrender.  Furthermore, Procter’s failure to destroy the 
fort became a new source of friction among the allies, as Natives insisted on fulfillment of 
Brock’s promise that their lands would be recovered.
163
  The other side of the equation was 
massive American reprisals against all Natives in the Ohio region – even against tribes like the 
Miami which had been loyal to the United States.
164
   
Lacking regulars he had to rely on Indian warriors, who meant to call the shots in their 
alliance with the British.  A British officer lamented: 
As we are now completely in the savages’ power, we are obliged in a great  
measure to act as they think proper…. Many dread the war whoop may sound in  
our ears, if we act contrary to their ideas, which are as wild as themselves.  We  
have spread a net which may catch us.
165
   
 
The British were now worried about the Americans launching an attack and their Native allies 
turning on them if they did not agree to follow Native orders. 
 The Indians also increased their harassment of the settlers in occupied Michigan.  A 
Detroit resident noted that when the Natives returned from the victory at Frenchtown they were 
“elated with their success and exhibited scalps, prisoners, and clothing.  They danced from door 
to door, and we were obliged to be silent spectators and give them refreshments of Victuals and 
drink lest we should share the same fate.”
166
  The psychological terror that had been an 
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advantage for the British was gradually becoming a problem as the war progressed.  The British 
feared for their own safety and could not protect captives or people in conquered territory.   
 Procter was forced to attempt another attack on Fort Meigs while his supply lines were 
dangerously thin.  He reflected on the large gathering of natives: “The encampment of this large 
body of warriors with their women and children presented an imposing spectacle.  They were 
perhaps a more numerous assemblage of the Indian nations than had ever united in arms in a 
common cause.”
167
  Again the siege on Fort Meigs failed, but rather than return to Amherstberg, 
Procter decided to attack Fort Stephenson along the Sandusky River.  Again, the native alliance 
was the reason.  The British Indian Department leaders openly declared that without some kind 
of victory, the Natives would desert the expedition.
168
   
Again, Procter was left with fewer natives than he expected.  He wrote, “We could not 
muster hundreds of Indians than I might reasonable have expected thousands.”
169
 Tecumseh did 
not accompany Procter to Fort Stephenson, rather he returned with a large body of Native 
Americans to Amherstburg to protect native families from an American invasion.
170
  Procter 
proceeded with his forces and was promptly routed by the Americans at Fort Stephenson.  In his 
report Procter attributes the loss to his allies:  
The troops maintained the greatest bravery … but the Indians who had proposed the 
assault, and had it not been assented to, would have ever stigmatized the British 
character, scarcely came under fire, before they ran off out of reach.  A more than 
adequate sacrifice having been made to Indian opinion, I drew off the brave assailants 
who had been carried away by a high sense of honour to urge too strongly the attack … 
You will perceive that my Indian force is seldom disposable, never to be relied on in the 
hour of need, and is only found to be useful in proportion as we are independent of it.
171
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The alliance between the British and the Native Americans was slowly fragmenting.  Many of 
the neutral tribes in the Ohio region declared support for the Americans in hopes of being 
provisioned.
172
  Even Tecumseh proposed to abandon the alliance, complaining that the British 
reinforcements had not arrived and the braves were being used to merely “start the game.”
173
 
Tecumseh remained loyal to the British, but the consequences of an inadequately 
supported Native alliance became apparent.  The confederacy had contributed substantially to 
past British successes.  Ironically though, as the number of braves increased, their military 
effectiveness diminished.  The Americans had effectively neutralized the benefits of guerilla 
warfare.  They forced concentrated engagements against fortifications in which the warriors’ 
individual form of fighting was disadvantaged.  The lack of success deprived the warriors of 
their motivating influences –plunder, scalps, revenge, and personal glory. As a result, there were 
many defections.   
Also, Native confidence in their allies was shaken by their failure to reduce fortifications.  
Tecumseh remained with the British out of necessity, but he typified Native attitudes in 
measuring the depth of British commitment in direct proportion to the visible British presence at 
Amherstburg.  The chief considered the ongoing shortages of provisions as proof of British 
duplicity.  Driven from their homes and their hunting grounds, these natives were entirely 
dependent on the British for everything. 
To the British officers, the Native allies had become a burden (they numbered over ten 
thousand people).
174
  The British commissariat was unable to keep up with native provisioning.  
In military terms, some British officers considered the braves undisciplined, insubordinate, 
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unreliable, and useless in storming fortifications.
175
  The British scheme of converting the 
western nations into “an impenetrable barrier” only brought them to the doorstep where the allied 
dissensions were magnified by inadequate provisioning.
176
 
More than anything else that affected the British-Indian alliance was the death of 
Tecumseh.  In October 1813, at the Battle of the Thames, Tecumseh was killed.  His death was 
enormously significant.  When they killed Tecumseh the Americans knocked a major foe out of 
the war.  Although the British missed Brock, who had died a year earlier, their state and military 
structure allowed for an orderly succession of command.  The Native American forces did not 
have a predetermined military structure akin to Britain’s that would allow for a smooth transition 
of power from Tecumseh to his successor.  With its towering leader gone, the confederacy 
disintegrated.
177
   
Tecumseh was not the only leader to envision a union of native peoples living on their 
own land.  Others came before, and still others tried after him.  But in his time, he was peerless – 
a man of enormous energy whose political gifts and willingness to work with others, whether 
they were native or white, made him singular in his determination to change the history of the 
continent.  When Tecumseh fell, the War of 1812 had reached its midpoint, but the combat in the 
northwest theater had effectively come to an end.  The whole of Tecumseh’s life was devoted to 
the struggle to hold on to native land in the Ohio country, in the Indiana territory, and indeed 
along the western edge of the American settlement to the Gulf of Mexico.  With his death on the 
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battlefield on the Thames River in Upper Canada, the native peoples were left devoid of another 
leader capable of the same things as Tecumseh.
178
   
The deaths of Tecumseh and Brock left the Native American dream in doubt and the 
alliance on shaky ground.  Who would hold the fragile alliance together?  Would the Native 
Americans be remembered in the peace talks at the end of the conflict or would they be 
completely ignored such as at the end of the French and Indian War or the Revolutionary War.  
Events across the world would again affect Native Americans. 
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Chapter Three - Peace 
With events unfolding in North American and in Europe, negotiations for peace opened 
in early 1814.  As previously discussed, the military impact of Native Americans waned as the 
war continued; however, this does not mean the British delegation would not push for their rights 
at the negotiating table.  Both sides were tired of fighting.  The United States was running low on 
money and the northeastern states were already meeting to discuss secession.  Great Britain had 
been mired in a continental struggle with Napoleon for a decade.
179
  The British government as 
well the British people were anxious to unload the heavy tax burden the wars commanded.  The 
fate of the Britain’s Native allies in North America would be decided a continent away, in 
Europe.   
In order to understand the peace process at Ghent the individuals involved in this peace 
process must be introduced.  On the British side, Lord Liverpool held an important role.  He 
became Prime Minister of Britain right before hostilities with the United States broke out.  His 
priority at the time was on Napoleon and Europe, but as events changed in Europe his focus 
would shift to the United States.  Lord Castlereagh, also a significant player in the peace process, 
was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  His job was to secure relationships with other 
countries and promote British interests abroad.  Lastly, there was Lord Bathurst, the Secretary 
for War and Colonies.  He would be responsible for the army and the British colonies.  Though 
the British sent other delegates to negotiations at Ghent, the decisions on their side were 
ultimately made by these three powerful men.
180
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The British delegation actually attending the peace negotiations was made up of three 
British officials.   The stated causes of the war regarded maritime issues, so a member of the 
House of Lords and a senior officer of the Royal Navy was selected, Vice-Admiral James 
Gambier.  William Adams, an expert in maritime and naval law, would be responsible for 
drafting the treaty’s clauses.  To lead the negotiations, War and Colonial Office Undersecretary 
Henry Goulburn was chosen.  He could be relied on to advance the British position with clarity 
and precision.
181
  He would also prove to an ardent supporter of the Native Americans and 
represented their interests at the negotiating table. Unfortunately, though, events out of his 
control would lead to the marginalization of the Natives. 
Goulburn was also expected to maintain strict lines of communication between Bathurst 
and Castlereagh. Britain (Goulburn) could initially afford to take a hard stance on the Indian 
issues because news from the western frontier was favorable.  Even though the Americans had 
established forts along the upper Mississippi in 1813, many had been abandoned by the summer 
of 1814.  Prairie du Chien was back under British control with help from the Native Americans.  
As the man in the government most familiar with the political and military complexities of the 
war in North America, Goulburn was determined to keep the Native alliance strong, so he 
continued to press for Native rights.
182
  
 The two sides could not have been more different.  The American delegation was made 
up of five men.  President James Madison named John Quincy Adams, James Bayard, Henry 
Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin as the American envoys.  Each of these members 
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possessed important traits, but it would be Henry Clay, a westerner who had pushed for the 
annexation of Canada, who would turn the question of a Native homeland upside down.
183
  
  The course of the war in North American had changed considerably since the onset of 
hostilities.  By the middle of 1813 the British and her Native allies were being pushed back into 
Upper Canada.  One of the ablest British officers, Isaac Brock, had already been killed, and the 
Native Confederacy lost its indispensable man in October.  The loss of Tecumseh was a blow to 
a loose association of tribes that was barely hanging on.  The Americans, however, were full of 
confidence.  General William Henry Harrison had recovered Detroit in the West and in the 
southern theater Andrew Jackson had the Creek tribe on the run.  As Tecumseh was fighting his 
last battle, across the world in Europe events were unfolding that would have a significant impact 
on the peace negotiations, including a Native state.
184
  
Napoleon was defeated at Leipzig in October 1813 and the French Empire was 
collapsing.  Consequently, he fled to France with an army led by Tsar Alexander I pursuing.  The 
Duke of Wellington pushed the French out of Spain back across the Pyrenees.  By April of 1814, 
Napoleon abdicated and accepted his exile.  After more than ten years of war, Europe was now at 
peace.  This would enable the British to free up their military accessories for use in North 
America.
185
   
Even though Liverpool wanted to alleviate some of the pressure a decade of war had had 
on the Treasury, his cabinet was determined to give Prevost sufficient means to not only defend, 
but go back on the offensive.  “It is the wish of His Majesty’s Government to press the war with 
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all possible vigour up to the moment when peace shall be finally concluded,”
186
 Bathurst wrote.  
In early May, London’s Morning Chronicle stated: “the Americans must soon face the ‘elite of 
the army.’”
187
  
 In short, the British were determined to punish the Americans with battle-tested troops.  
Within a week of Napoleon’s surrender, Wellington had orders to ready 13,000 troops for 
redeployment to Canada.
188
  The increase of regular troops would alleviate the strain of relying 
on the Native Americans and militia.  It also signaled the willingness of Great Britain to now 
keep pressing for complete victory over the United States.  A British commander stated, “I have 
it much at heart to give them a complete drubbing before peace is made, when I trust their 
northern limits will be circumscribed and the command of the Mississippi wrested from 
them.”
189
  American negotiator Albert Gallatin wrote from Europe that “the numerous English 
forces in France, Italy, Holland, and Portugal are ready for immediate service, and for which 
there is no further employment in Europe; … it is a very formidable army which we are not 
prepared to meet with any regular, well-organized force.”
190
  The Americans were worried about 
the size and strength of the force the British were preparing to send to America.  This show of 
strength would have had an effect on the negotiations; a total victory would allow the British to 
impose their terms of peace on the Americans, and the Native state would be the first goal of the 
British.   
                                                          
186
 Brian Jenkins, Henry Goulburn, 1784-1856: A Political Biography (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1996), 81. 
187
 Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823 (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1964), 36. 
188
 Zuehlke, For Honour’s Sake, 63. 
189
 A.T. Mahan, Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), 330-31. 
190
 Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1960), 602-3. 
68 
 
While Castlereagh wanted an end to the war in North America and hoped the negotiations 
at Ghent would bear fruit, he also believed the tide ran against the Americans.  So while the 
British government crawled slowly through the early summer to the peace talks, it 
simultaneously sped up the flow of troops and ships across the Atlantic.
191
  In a secret dispatch 
sent from Bathurst to Prevost dated June 2, 1814 Bathurst stated that Prevost would be 
resupplied with regular troops and his goal would be to protect British Canada and secure British 
possessions in Canada.  He stated Detroit and the Michigan Territory should be occupied.  
Success on this front would restore Detroit and the Michigan Territory to the Indians, rendering 
the British frontier materially improved.
192
  The intention was clear to Prevost: he wished to 
seize the momentum from the Americans and occupy territory that the British government would 
retain, either for the Indians or as part of an expanded British North America.
193
  The goal of 
Bathurst and the British government was to secure the British frontier, an issue that would play a 
major role in the Treaty of Ghent a few months later.  Although the Natives would receive the 
Michigan Territory it was only to protect British Canada.
194
  The British would push the native 
state to the forefront only to help keep their imperialistic lands in Canada secure, but not 
concerning themselves with actual native desires. 
The British negotiating team finally arrived in Ghent in August 1814.  Castlereagh had 
given the British team instruction as to how to proceed with the negotiations.  There were four 
overarching themes under which all possible issues at hand could be categorized.  First, maritime 
rights, of which the most important in His Majesty’s eyes was the right to “enforce in war the 
allegiance and service of his subjects; secondly, the protection which the Indians, as allies, are 
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entitled to claim at our hands;…”
195
  Castlereagh instructed his commissioner to assert an array 
of non-negotiable stipulations, at the same time, drawing out American feelings on certain issues 
without committing the British to anything.
196
 
Castlereagh gave his delegation specific instructions to make the Indian boundary issue a 
sine qua non, or absolute.  He stated that Britain and the United States must “place their mutual 
relationships with each other, as well as with several Indian nations, upon a footing of less 
jealousy and irritation.”  He believed this could be accomplished by “a mutual guarantee of the 
Indian possessions, as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part 
of either state.”  If both governments regarded “Indian Territory as a useful barrier between both 
states they would have a common interest to render these people…peaceful neighbors.”
197
   
Castlereagh’s instructions demonstrate his desire for the Native buffer state.  In his view, 
both countries should guarantee native sovereignty in this area and it would be advantageous for 
both.  He concluded that America would be able to end the costly and bloody Indian wars while 
its insatiable desire for expansion would be checked to the satisfaction of the Indians and Great 
Britain.  Besides, since the United States already controlled vast parts of North America, this 
need for continued expansion perplexed Castlereagh.  He thought it would be more logical for 
the Americans to accept limits and avoid further Indian wars.
198
  He was mistaken in his belief 
that the Americans would accept this. 
America’s seizure of most of the Floridas and multiple invasions of Canada led 
Castlereagh to seek revision of the frontier boundaries between the U.S. and British North 
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America, but he did not state how those boundaries were to be drawn.  He only said that the 
Treaty of 1783, which set the present boundaries had been “very hastily and improvidently 
framed in this respect.”
199
  The wording was left vague by Castlereagh to see how the Americans 
would react to redefining boundaries on territory they already occupied. 
On August 8, 1814 Goulburn delivered the British demands to the American delegation.  
As instructed, he pushed for Native rights as a sine qua non.  Goulburn stated that the Indian 
boundary must be “definitively marked out, as a permanent barrier between the dominions of 
Great Britain and the United States.”
200
  He also stated Britain wanted to revise the boundary line 
between American and British North America.  Responding to questions from the Americans 
Goulburn quickly assured them that Britain “did not contemplate an acquisition of territory.”
201
   
Castlereagh did not provide any instructions, so the British did not define the proposed 
Indian boundary or Canadian border revision.  Actually, Goulburn was more familiar with the 
geography of North America and its current boundaries than his superior, so he pressed the issue 
more forcefully than his instructions suggested.
202
  He was determined that any treaty stifle 
further imperialistic designs America might have.
203
  This is an important point because he 
wanted to check American expansion and the native buffer zone would be the key to doing it.  
Goulburn did not express his desire to check American expansion, but was using his negotiating 
wit to secure the advantage for Britain.     
The Americans were not prepared for the Native provision in the peace treaty.  They 
returned to their hotel in order to construct some type of response to the British demands.  
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Privately, Gallatin wrote to his son that the British demanded that the “Indian tribes should have 
the whole of the North-Western Territory.  This comprises the States of Michigan, Wisconsin, 
and Illinois—four fifths of Indiana and a third of Ohio.  That an Indian sovereignty should be 
constituted under the guarantee of Great Britain: this is to protect Canada… But all this means 
the dismemberment of the United States.”
204
  Simply put, the British had followed through with 
their intention to put forth the Native American interests that had been promised and the United 
States did not know how to respond.  
Communication in the early nineteenth century was already slow, but with the American 
delegation across the Atlantic it would take weeks to hear back on the Native question.  When 
the two sides met to discuss the Natives, John Quincy Adams stated that instructions could not 
have been expected on the Indian question because this was “never contemplated by them as 
being in dispute.  No European power had ever considered the Indian Nations as Great Britain 
appeared to now consider them.”
205
  Adams wanted the British delegation to modify their stance 
on the Natives so that they could at least discuss the other points in the peace treaty. 
 Goulburn would respond by stating that both powers had made treaties with the Indians 
and some of these nations were British allies, so it was not beyond contemplation that “Britain 
would stipulate for them in any treaty with the US.”
206
  He went on to say that it would be 
difficult to construct any type of peace agreement without some assurance that the Americans 
could at least agree to a provisional article even without specific instructions.
207
  In truth, the 
British are pushing vehemently to get a peace treaty with the Native Americans included, but not 
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with Native interests in mind.  Goulburn would continue on and state that his government’s view 
was clearly “to procure to her Allies a peace as permanent as that procured for themselves and to 
establish the Indian Nations as a sort of barrier between the two states to prevent their future 
collision.”
208
  The British were pushing the Native question forward with the protection of their 
territory, Canada, in mind. 
The Americans argued that a barrier would be achieved if Britain and the United States 
entered into a peace treaty and then the U.S. independently negotiated peace agreements with the 
Indians.  They believed commissions for negotiations with the Indians had already been 
appointed and those agreements would “fix limits to their territories.”  The British 
commissioners understood that the United States had historically broken one treaty after another 
with the Indians, but they refrained from any sharp rebuke.  The British wanted to negotiate a 
peace treaty and did not want a squabble between delegations.  The tension was present though 
and Goulburn calmly stated that Britain wanted to assure “the permanence of peace made with 
the Indians.”
209
     
    The American commissioners were increasingly irritated.  American commissioner 
James Bayard asked if the negotiating point with the Indians was intended to prevent the British 
from losing their own lands.  The British responded that “the restraint need not be on the Indian 
right of alienation but on the right of the U.S. or Great Britain to acquire those lands by purchase 
or cession.”  The Natives could still sell to a third party.  Henry Clay snapped that he had 
“extreme difficulty” believing that any article on the Native subject would be accepted by the 
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American government.
210
  Both delegations had begun to snipe at each other over the Indian 
question.  With negotiations deadlocked, both sides agreed to take a few days to review what had 
been discussed.   
While the two commissions were not meeting, Goulburn wrote Bathurst that, “there was 
little hope of their concluding anything [with regard to the Indian boundary] without the receipt 
of instructions from America.”  He asked Bathurst if it was worthwhile to continue to discuss 
other points of peace without a response on the Indian question.
211
 Though the Americans did not 
know it, Britain had the upper hand in the negotiations at this point.  The British delegation knew 
that its powerful fleet had been sent to invade America and destroy Washington, D.C.  They 
could push the Indian question harder knowing that with a large force set to invade the America 
the American delegation would want a peace agreement.  The location at Ghent gave the British 
quicker communication with their government and it also allowed the Americans to read the 
European newspapers.  They understood what would happen to America with regular troops now 
being sent to Canada.  John Quincy Adams was extremely anxious without a peace agreement.  
He believed that America would soon face a blow that would “lay us prostrate at the mercy of 
our foe. God forbid!”
212
 
The Americans sent a draft of the negotiations back to the United States, illustrating the 
fact that the British commission had not come to Ghent to negotiate in good faith.  The 
Americans believed that the British had come with intent to use the dispute over Indian 
boundaries as pretense for breaking off discussions.  Whether or not the British were using the 
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Native American territory as a means to break off negotiations cannot be known for sure, but the 
British delegation did make the Indian issue extremely important at the start of negotiations.   
On August 19, British instructions on how to continue the peace talks arrived with 
Viscount Castlereagh.  He was passing through Ghent on his way to Vienna, where a congress 
was to convene in September that would redraw the map of Europe.  This was an important 
meeting that required his full attention.  He needed to guide his country through a peace process 
that had taken more than a decade to achieve.   
Castlereagh was not staying in Ghent long, but had some instruction for his delegation.  
Castlereagh stated “…they could have had no reason to suppose that the British Government 
would for a moment listen to a separate peace, to the exclusion of the Indians, who have acted 
with them as allies during the war.”
213
  He also reiterated that the inclusion of the Indians in the 
peace remained a sine qua non and suggested the Treaty of Greenville imposed by William 
Henry Harrison , wherein the Indians had surrendered the Ohio Valley to America, could serve 
as the basis for negotiations.  The boundaries once agreed were not open to acquisition through 
purchase by either side.
214
  These instructions were welcomed by Goulburn, but he became 
perplexed at the wording Castlereagh used.  He insisted on the prohibition of either power 
gaining Indian territory so that it denied acquisition only by purchase.  When the negotiations 
first started, Goulburn had explained that this prohibition would mean that neither party could 
acquire territory inside the Indian boundary by purchase “or otherwise.”
215
   
With this, a small crack was beginning to appear in the British defense of the Native 
cause.  Castlereagh stated that he objected to Goulburn’s inserting the additional word.  It was 
                                                          
213
 Vane, Correspondence, Despatches and other Paper of Viscount Castlereagh, 84. 
214
 Zuehlke, For Honour’s Sake, 310. 
215
 “Letters from Henry Goulburn to Earl Bathurst,” 196. 
75 
 
not Britain’s intent “to preclude the Americans from conquering the Indians who might be at war 
with them and acquiring territory by conquest as a restriction of this nature would expose them to 
invasion from the Indians from which there would be no redress.”
216
  Castlereagh worried that 
the Indians who were displaced from the United States during American expansion would 
overrun Canada.  He was not concerned about Native American desires, only pressing forward 
what was best for British interests.  He was momentarily passing through Ghent on his way to a 
historic meeting of leaders in Vienna.  His mind was on pressing issues in Europe at the time.  If 
the point was brought up again, he instructed Goulburn to “disclaim such a view.”
217
  
This was a setback for the Native Americans and it infuriated Goulburn.  He wrote 
immediately to his superior Lord Bathurst.  He stated his dismay at the Americans not being able 
to purchase Indian territory, but rather conquer it.   
The Americans will I am sure be ready to assign a boundary if they are told that they may 
conquer though they may not purchase the territory within….Causes of War will always 
be found for they almost always exist and the only difference in the situation of Canada 
will be that its frontier will be laid open by a conquering American Army under General 
Harrison instead of by Treaties for Sale as heretofore….I do not quite see the justice of 
Lord Castlereagh’s distinction….In other instances in which Barriers of a similar kind 
have been created (in the low countries for instance) it was never conceived that either 
country could destroy that Barrier by conquest whatever injuries she might sustain from 
the inhabitants within it and surely if the Indian Territory is made a barrier it ought to 
have a similar exemption.  America has modes of punishing the Indians more effective 
than the occupation of their Territory: indeed the occupation of a territory is no 
punishment: for an Indian nation has always heretofore been in the habit of indemnifying 
itself for the encroachment of this nature by invading a neighbouring nation more remote 
from the original encroacher—The arrangement too will operate unfairly against us –If an 
American Indian nation injures us we cannot attack them because they are within the 
limits of the United States and remonstrance is out only mode of obtaining redress.
218
   
 
Goulburn felt all of this would provide the Americans with a reason to eliminate the Indians and 
come up against the Canadian frontier.  His anger is felt in the letter to Bathurst, but it is not 
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necessarily attributable to the Native Americans losing their land.  It appears that Goulburn is 
more upset by the fact that the barrier state could be conquered, thus the United States would be 
brought right up against Canada.  He believed Native Americans would be forced to attack 
Canada when the U.S. threw them off their land.  He did not appear to be upset with the lack of 
land for the Native Americans, rather that the lands could have been conquered, placing the 
British possession of Canada directly in the path of the Americans and Native Americans.  This 
same point of contention would come up again in a private conversation between Goulburn and 
John Quincy Adams. 
 Goulburn reluctantly followed the directions of his superior and the meeting with the 
American delegation lasted less than an hour.  It turned into a shouting match, with the 
Americans wondering what would happen to the approximately 100,000 people living behind the 
Treaty of Greenville’s line.  Goulburn did not even mention Castlereagh’s point that the 
Americans could gain by conquest what they would be prohibited from purchasing.  The 
Americans did not press for details, apparently thinking they were to be denied any avenue to 
acquire territory.
219
  Although given specific instructions, Goulburn discreetly kept the Native 
American interests at the forefront.      
Britain (Goulburn) could afford to take a hard stance on the Indian issues because news 
from the western frontier was favorable.  Even though the Americans had established forts along 
the upper Mississippi in 1813, many had been abandoned by the summer of 1814.  Prairie du 
Chien was back under British control with help from the Native Americans.  British control over 
Lake Huron, ensured the strong allegiance of the still potent western Indian allies.  As the man in 
the government most familiar with the political and military complexities of the war in North 
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America, Goulburn was determined not to undermine this alliance, so he did not raise 
Castlereagh’s point.
220
      
Goulburn assured Castlereagh that the Americans “were disposed both to treat and sign 
on these arrangements.”  He believed if the British stood firm, with what had taken place, and 
with British veterans getting ready to invade America, the American delegation would acquiesce.  
Castlereagh was preoccupied with Vienna and anxious.  He worried that the war drifted toward a 
purely territorial conflict for parts of North America that Britain had little need for.  Adding 
more trackless wilderness to the empire hardly warranted the inherent costs.  There was also the 
nagging fear that they engaged in a war unlikely to be lost but equally impossible to win.
221
  
Writing to Prime Minister Liverpool, he pondered compromises that might lead the American 
commissioners to enter into a provisional agreement that included an Indian peace and left Indian 
boundaries for a later discussion.
222
  He did not want to break the negotiations off over the Indian 
issue and give the Americans the propaganda advantage back home.  The Indians were of course 
not his concern, but policy imperatives at home (cost) and abroad (Vienna) were marginalizing 
them. 
The North American battlefront indisputably influenced the faltering negotiations at 
Ghent.  Part of the problem with the Native American issue was that communication was very 
slow across the Atlantic.  The British delegation was receiving orders within a couple of days.  
The American delegation was negotiating on instructions they had received from their 
government months ago.  They requested a written document with the British points to send back 
to America to be further reviewed.  The British complied and, despite Castlereagh’s instruction 
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against prohibiting the right to acquire territory through conquest, Goulburn inserted the 
requirement that neither Britain nor the United States would “acquire by purchase, or otherwise, 
any territory.”
223
  Castlereagh thought the tone of the letter too confrontational, but approved the 
document, perhaps not reading it carefully.  After approving it, he and his caravan of people and 
goods continued their journey to Vienna.  He was not focused on the document, but getting 
himself and his luggage to Vienna.  Goulburn told the American delegation that they should 
agree to terms now, or face tougher terms later. 
Castlereagh was much less optimistic than Goulburn at this point.  He worried that the 
war drifted toward a purely territorial conflict for parts of North America that Britain little 
needed.  Adding more trackless wilderness to the empire hardly warranted the massive costs.  
There was also the nagging fear that they were engaged in a war unlikely to be lost but equally 
impossible to win.
224
  Castlereagh did not know why Britain was even fighting anymore.   
The American negotiators understood the British tactics.  American Albert Gallatin 
believed the British might win everything they wanted from the barrel of a gun.  He predicted a 
major offensive to gain control of the Great Lakes, a widened Indian war that must be met 
vigorously by America to expel the adjacent tribes or force them to sue for peace and thus 
eliminate the sine qua non pretext.  He also knew about the large force of British regulars that 
was to sail for North America.  He stated “It is highly probable that our struggle will be longer 
and more arduous than I had anticipated.”
225
  If the negotiations had ended at this point, the 
British very well could have secured the territory they had desired for the Native Americans, but 
this was not the end and British positions were shifting on the matter. 
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A few days later, the Americans responded to the British.  The Americans believed the 
war was rooted in maritime issues, so the demand that the America surrender “one-third of the 
territorial dominions of the United States to perhaps 20,000 Indians” was both unforeseeable and 
certain to be rejected.
226
  The terms imposed by Britain:  
would inflict the most vital injury on the United States, by dismembering their territory, 
by arresting their natural growth and increase of population, by leaving their northern and 
western frontier equally exposed to British invasion, and to Indian aggression; they are, 
above all, DISHONORABLE to the United States, in demanding from them to abandon 
territory and a portion of their citizens, to admit a foreign interference in their domestic 
concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights on their own shores, and in their 
own waters.
227
  
  
The demands made by Britain were “new and unexpected pretensions” that raised “an 
insuperable obstacle to pacification.”
228
  This was a firm American response.  They would not 
give back land to the Native Americans and have their country divided up.  The natural growth 
of the United States would continue and the Native American buffer state was something that 
would not stop this growth.   
The British negotiators had no instruction as to which course of action to take if the 
Americans did not enter into a provisional agreement, so they forwarded the information to 
London.  The firmness of the response startled the British cabinet.  Castlereagh wrote to Prime 
Minister Liverpool that the proposition regarding the Indian boundaries had been stated too 
“peremptorily.”  In more muddied language than in previous written instructions, he again 
argued against Britain being drawn into a territorial war over the Indian question.  He was 
leaving Paris within the hour so lacked the time to generate any kind of meaningful response, but 
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left it up to Liverpool, Bathurst, and staff to decide the ultimate response.
229
  It is clear at this 
point that Castlereagh was too preoccupied with Vienna to worry about the conflict in North 
America.  At this point, he had washed his hands of the situation by leaving up to others in the 
government to construct a response. 
Liverpool wanted a more conciliatory tone adopted while offering no significant change 
in course of action because there was no military justification for compromise.  He thought the 
commissioners had “certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy.”  He was also weary of 
the negotiations breaking off on the Native American point because the war would “have become 
quite popular in America.”  He wanted blame for breaking off of peace talks to fall on the 
American delegation.  He wrote Castlereagh that “If our commander does his duty, I am 
persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we 
ought to insist on keeping.”
230
  Liverpool still believed the Indian buffer state could be achieved 
through force by the British, but did not want to rupture negotiations over the Indian question 
and risk galvanizing the Americans at home.   
While negotiations were at a halt, John Quincy Adams and Henry Goulburn had an 
insightful conversation into the Native American component of negotiations.  Goulburn angrily 
shouted at Adams that conquering Canada had been the war’s only objective.  This was why the 
Great Lakes must be secured and a barrier nation created for the Indians—to preclude America’s 
embarking on another war of conquest.  Again, the fate of Canada and not the Native Americans 
was the main concern.  John Quincy Adams suggested both sides grant amnesty to those Indians 
living inside their existing boundaries that had fought for the other nation.  Goulburn pressed that 
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they must be considered independent nations because America had entered into treaties with 
them in the past.
231
  This reflected acceptance that these people enjoyed nationhood. 
John Quincy Adams stated that where the Indians formed settlements and grew crops, 
this civilized behavior resulted in respect of their property by the United States.  He then stated 
that most Indians were “wandering hunters” so set against settlement that was impossible for 
such people to have possessions.  Their only rights to the land was to use it as hunting-grounds, 
and when those lands where they hunted became necessary or convenient for the purpose of 
settlement the U.S. would acquire it by treaty.  The proposal that the Indians have a nation with 
inviolable borders was bound to fail.  “It was like opposing a feather to a torrent,” Adams 
stated.
232
  The United States population numbered eight million; its boundaries must expand as 
the population grew. 
Goulburn shouted back that it was inevitable that the United States must conquer Canada, 
too.  Adams specified that this was not the intent of America and Great Britain must secure 
Canada’s borders with her great military superiority.  Goulburn rejected this and stated Canada 
could never have security.  He also declared that there were many civilized Indians, and the 
American policy of pushing them back from their lands only drove these people into the British 
provinces where they encroached on the boundaries of Indians already dwelling there.
233
  For the 
first time Goulburn shared his private beliefs that without a Native American homeland the tribes 
would become a problem in Canada.  Many tribes would be pushed onto the lands of other tribes 
and the British would be forced to deal with an encroaching United States while at the same time 
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mediating Native American disputes.  Adams claimed to have never had heard this argument 
before and the two men left angrily.
234
 
Both negotiating teams expected talks to break off at this point.  The test of wills was 
plain to see.  Each side was trying to get the other to break off negotiations in order to bolster 
support in their respective country to continue the war.  The Native homeland was pushed hard 
by Britain to get the Americans to break off talks, but the Americans resisted on this point.  The 
Native Americans were important to the British as a bargaining chip.  On September 4, the 
British presented their response to the Americans.  Goulburn concluded that the Americans had:  
no real intention of making Peace but had acceded to the proposal of negotiating with the 
sole view of deriving from the negotiations some means of reconciling the People of 
America to the continuance of the War—The Indian Boundary appears to them calculated 
to answer this object, and their desire of negotiating is therefore at an end.
235
   
 
In the British response they stated that the United States would have taken Canada if the 
British had not been able to reinforce their armies.  A decade of American expansionism in the 
Spanish Florida and Louisiana colonies was detailed.  They closed by stating that they had 
offered a reasonable proposal that America remove itself militarily from the Great Lakes and 
accede to an Indian nation whose boundaries provided a protective buffer between British and 
American territory had been rejected.  They then offered a defense of the proposition that 
America should return all territory beyond the Treaty of Greenville boundaries.  In closing the 
British delegation wanted to know whether the Americans “will take upon themselves the 
responsibility of breaking off the negotiations altogether.”
236
  The British again pushed the 
Indian buffer state idea with the protection of Canada as their main objective.  They stated that 
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Canada was saved by British reinforcements, which not entirely accurate, marginalizes the 
assistance Native Americans provided throughout the first half of the war.   
The Americans took five days to craft a stinging response.  On September 9, their 
response refuted the need for an Indian boundary and decried any limit on American expansion 
as “arresting the natural growth of their population and strength” while dooming the Indians to 
“perpetual barbarism.”  The Americans maintained again that they held no hostile intentions 
towards the Indians and wanted peaceful coexistence.  They voiced their displeasure on the 
British “deployment of savages, whose known rule of warfare is the indiscriminate torture and 
butchery of women, children, and prisoners, is itself a departure from the principles of humanity 
observed between all civilized and Christian Nations, even in war.”  The actions led to 
“unjustifiable aggravation of the calamities and horrors of war.”  Without offering specific 
incidents, they accused British officers of watching over massacres and despoiling of the dead by 
Indian warriors.  The American delegation had again rejected the idea of an independent Indian 
nation, but they closed their response by saying that they remained ready as always to continue 
the negotiations.
237
 
Although not explicitly said, it was clear that the American delegation was referencing 
events that took place at Frenchtown during the winter of 1813.  They used the event to reject the 
idea of an independent Indian nation.  The British commissioners thought the American response 
would rupture the negotiations, but they waited for a response from London as to what to say.  It 
was plain they considered matters at an end.
238
  Goulburn and Clay spoke that evening at dinner 
about the Native American issue.  He explained to Goulburn that even if the United States 
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acceded to the Indian boundary proposition and the eastern states and Great Britain tried to 
enforce such an agreement, they would not be able to “restrain that part of the American 
population which is to the Westward of the Alleghany, from encroaching upon the Indian 
Territory and gradually expelling the aboriginal inhabitants.”  Goulburn listened and wrote 
Bathurst that under “these circumstances I do not deem it possible to conclude a good peace 
now—as I cannot consider that a good peace . . . leaves the Indians to a dependence on the 
liberal policy of the United States.”
239
  Goulburn appeared to still have the Native Americans in 
mind, but the Americans were not retreating and his superiors were quickly softening on the 
issue. 
While Goulburn wrote to his superior, the strength of the Native American position was 
weakening.  Liverpool and Castlereagh, independently of each (Castlereagh was travelling 
through Europe), succumbed to second thoughts.  Castlereagh was moving from one European 
seat of power to another on a long path that would eventually end in Vienna and found the 
American war ever less important.  The puzzle of reconstructing the stability of continental 
European empires was a demanding challenge, one that required his full attention.  The 
unnecessary and costly war across the Atlantic continued to intrude on his valuable time and 
energy.  He thought that perhaps the commissioners had taken too hard a stance and when the 
record of discussions was disclosed, the opposition in the House of Commons in London would 
hold the government accountable for failing to negotiate a treaty.
240
  Castlereagh was worried 
that he would be held responsible for not negotiating a peace with America over the issue of the 
Native Americans.
241
  Although they had been a major ally to the British, he was not willing to 
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sacrifice his reputation for people thousands of miles away that would never have an impact on 
his life.  He was also extremely consumed by the more important matter of putting Europe back 
together and thought the British position should be softened to conciliate the Americans. 
Liverpool reached the same conclusion.  He wrote Bathurst that the commissioners 
“evidently do not feel the inconveniences of the war.  I feel it strongly, but I feel it is nothing 
now compared with what it may be a twelve-month hence, and I am particularly anxious 
therefore, that we should avoid anything which may increase our difficulties concluding it.”
242
  
The “anything which may increase our difficulties” being the Native Americans.  The cause 
championed by the British delegation, especially Goulburn, was now being pushed aside.  A 
chink in the British armor was now exposed. 
Goulburn received the softening stance with dismay.  He detected a weakening resolve to 
decide the issue on the battlefield and was disappointed with the arrangements being made for 
the attack on New Orleans.  The original plan called for 15,000 Peninsular veterans to sail from 
France on this mission.  Britain realized the city’s strategic importance at the mouth of the 
Mississippi River, but there had never been enough soldiers to undertake this operation until 
victory over France was achieved.  Liverpool’s cabinet cancelled the operation as strains 
between Russia and Britain over dominance in Europe warranted maintaining a sizable army on 
the continent.  Only 2,600 veterans were sent and they joined 3,400 men under General Robert 
Ross.  The instructions were given, but Ross had already been dead a week from fighting at 
Baltimore.
243
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Bathurst believed the British in North America to be successful everywhere.  Slow early 
nineteenth century communication prevented him from knowing the truth.  He wanted Britain to 
seize the mouth of the Mississippi and another chunk of land in the southern United States, such 
as New Orleans or Georgia, to be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations.
244
  It was thought 
that friendly Indians waited to greet the British with open arms.     
Goulburn did not think the force was nearly large enough, but he was in Ghent.  His 
absence from Downing Street denied him influence over the war’s trajectory.  He was also not 
happy with the efforts of Governor Sir George Prevost in Canada.  That he could not gain 
supremacy on the Great lakes was incomprehensible, his “indisposition to attempt anything” 
almost treasonable.  Goulburn believed the Native Americans were being pushed off the 
negotiating table because British men in positions of power were not competent, namely Prevost.  
A sense of futility weighed on Goulburn, as he witnessed the cabinet soften its stance at the 
negotiating table, especially on the Native American component.  Looking at the new 
instructions from London he sensed the Indians might be completely abandoned.
245
  
Gone was the insistence on a distinct Indian nation with guaranteed boundaries based on 
the Treaty of Greenville.  Instead the Indians should be included in the treaty and “restored to all 
the rights, privileges, and territories which they enjoyed in the year 1811 previous to the 
commencement of the war.”  Boundaries were open to discussion and a reciprocal agreement 
proposed that neither side purchase lands lying within these “lines of demarcation.”  No longer 
did the word otherwise appear; nor did the phrase sine qua non.  Also, the boundaries could be 
revised on agreement.  The Great Lakes and other territorial issues between the United States and 
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Canada could be set aside in order to focus on the Indian question.
246
  Reduction in the 
importance of the Native Americans was becoming a bitter reality to the man who had fiercely 
fought for their rights through the summer of 1814.  Everything the British pushed forward on 
the Native question they were now backpedaling on.    
     The Americans received the British note on September 20 and quickly recognized the 
shift it represented, but it did not lift their spirits.  John Quincy Adams stated that “we so fondly 
cling to the vain hope of peace that every new proof of its impossibility operates upon us as a 
disappointment.”
247
  The Americans knew that Washington would never agree to include any 
articles regarding the Indians.  Albert Gallatin concluded it would be “a bad point for us to break 
off negotiations upon; that the difficulty of war might compel us to admit the principle at least, 
for now the British had so committed themselves with regard to the Indians that it was 
impossible for them to further retreat.”
248
  Even though the British softened their stance 
considerably, they still wanted an agreement dealing with the Native Americans.  The American 
delegation would not sign a treaty if it included the Native Americans.  Both sides were still 
using negotiating tactics at this point, but the British were consistently lessening their Native 
American demands.   
With each British note it seemed to take the Americans longer to respond because their 
delegation was larger and more voices had to be heard.  While crafting a response to the British, 
English newspapers arrived containing accounts of the American defeat at Lundy’s Lane along 
the Niagara frontier.  Adams lamented in his diary that this was likely the first of “a long and 
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heavy series before us.”
249
  Even though concerned with the events unfolding in North America, 
the America delegation rigidly held their ground on the Native American proposal. 
The America response circled back to many of the previous arguments they had made, 
though they were stated in different words.  They pounded the point that America would always 
treat the Indians fairly but that the nation must be free, “in proportion as their growing 
population may require, to reclaim from a state of nature, and to bring into cultivation” territory 
as needed.  In doing so:  
they will not violate any dictate or justice of humanity; for they will not only give to a 
few thousand savages, scattered over that territory, an ample equivalent for any right they 
may surrender, but will always leave them the possessions of lands more than they can 
cultivate, and more than adequate to their subsistence, comfort, and enjoyment by 
cultivation.
250
   
 
They ended their response by stating that “peace would long since have been concluded, had not 
an insuperable bar against it been raised by the new and unprecedented demands of the British 
government.”
251
  The unprecedented demands were the Native American homeland and the 
boundaries that they could never concede.  It was again left to the British to break off 
negotiations.  The Americans wanted the British to abandon the Native interests totally and 
accept peace or stick with the Natives and not have peace.  They awaited the British response. 
While awaiting the British response news reached Ghent of the burning of Washington, 
D.C.  The Americans were shaken by the news, but the British were uncertain how to best 
exploit it.  Bathurst, who like Goulburn preferred a tough stance, instructed the British to put the 
Indian nation proposal back on the table with the old statement of willingness to accept a 
provisional agreement subject to U.S. government approval.  They could not give the tough 
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response until hearing from London though.  Unfortunately, Bathurst’s position was unsupported 
by Liverpool or Castlereagh.   
The Prime Minister considered the destruction of Washington “very satisfactory,” but 
assured Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington that it made “no difference in our anxious desire 
to put an end to the war if it can be done consistently with our honour.”  Liverpool believed that 
terms being offered to the Americans were so conciliatory that he would face a backlash at 
home:   
But I feel too strongly the inconvenience of a continuance of the war not to make me 
desirous of concluding it at the expense of some popularity; and it is a satisfaction to 
reflect that our military success will at least divest the peace of anything which could 
affect our national character.
252
  
 
 Liverpool was happy with the British military success, but was willing to accept the peace they 
had already offered and not put the Native American state back on the negotiating table.   
On October 5, Bathurst appended a note to the reply that instructed the commissioners to 
feel free to alter it if doing so would render it more palatable to the Americans.  The proposed 
Indian article was not to be touched though, as its substance was too important.  If the American 
refused to accept this then they should return home. 
 The British response contained much legal precedence to justify the British claims to a 
right to negotiate on behalf of the Indians.  No longer, however, was there anything about 
creating an Indian nation.  It stated that the United States considered all Indians living within 
lands claimed by it as American subjects and when these people sided with the British in the 
current war they were exposed to retribution “as rebels, or disaffected persons.”  The Americans 
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could then force them off their land at will.  This was something the British, even though they 
wanted peace, could have never accepted.
253
  
 The British proposed that, upon entering into a treaty, both countries be bound to end all 
hostilities with Indian tribes they were at war with and “restore to such tribes or nations, 
respectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been 
entitled to in 1811, previous to such hostilities; provided always, that such tribes or nations shall 
agree to desist from all hostilities” upon being notified of the agreement.  This was “their 
ultimatum.”  The British “anxiously” awaited a reply because “their continuance in this place 
will depend” on the American response.
254
  The British were now dropping much of their 
original insistence on Native American land and boundaries.  They were hoping that by 
eliminating so much about the Native Americans that the American delegation would have had 
no choice but to accept and end the fighting.  Native American rights were being sacrificed 
further at the negotiating table because the British wanted a swift end to the war and thought they 
could get it because they burned the American capital.    
 The Americans received the British correspondence on October 8 and realized it signified 
a substantial retreat on earlier demands relative to the Indians.  Rejecting the new British 
proposal would be political suicide.  When the record of negotiations was made public, the 
government would face the outrage of New England and probably other parts of the nation for 
turning its back on peace by rejecting a moderate proposal.  The five commissioners would have 
had to take the full blame for mishandling the negotiations.
255
  The Americans agreed to accept 
the article about the Native Americans, but needed to see the entirety of the British treaty before 
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things could progress further.  Meanwhile, back in America, the American government 
authorized it’s delegation to drop all previous demands if the “status quo ante bellum” could be 
restored.  They were empowered to follow their own judgment in agreeing to treaty articles, 
subject, of course, to ratification by the government.
256
 
 British commissioners forwarded the desire of the Americans to see the outline of a treaty 
to their superiors in London.  Liverpool was not in a good mood as news of British defeats at 
Baltimore and the complete failure of the invasion through Lake Champlain angered him.  
Goulburn worrily wrote Bathurst that “we owed the acceptance of our article respecting the 
Indians to the capture of Washington and if we had either burnt Baltimore or held Platsburgh I 
believe we should have had peace on the terms which you have sent to us in a month at the latest.  
As things appear to be going on in America the result of our negotiation may be very 
different.”
257
  As the course of events turned against the British in North America, Goulburn was 
not sure they could even keep the Indian article in the negotiations because they were losing 
bargaining power quickly. 
 The British delivered their reply to the Americans.  The Indian article stayed the same, 
but the northwest boundary ran from Lake of the Woods (present-day Minnesota) to the 
Mississippi, and the others could be negotiated.  This effectively eliminated any chance of the 
Native Americans gaining any territory.  They would now be in the same situation they were in 
before the war except America would have control over all of the Northwest Territory.  As soon 
as the British signed the treaty, there would be no more support for the Indians and the 
Americans would be free to do whatever they wanted to with people inside of “their territory.”
258
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 Liverpool was compelled to sign a treaty as soon as possible due to a couple of other 
factors at the time as well.  George Prevost was not getting the military results the British had 
wanted in North America, but there was no one to replace him.  The Duke of Wellington was the 
obvious choice, but he had so much influence that he got to choose where he would serve.  
Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, “I feel most anxious that he should accept the command in 
America.  There is no other person we can send there really equal to the situation….The Duke of 
Wellington would restore confidence to the army, place the military operations on a proper 
footing, and give us the best chance of peace with America if it can be made upon terms at all 
honourable.”
259
  The Prime Minister was looking for someone to lead the war effort in Canada 
that would allow the British to have all of their demands met, including the Native American 
state. 
 The Duke of Wellington sent his reply on November 9, but it was not what Liverpool 
wanted to hear: “I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objection to going to 
America, though I do not promise much success there.  I believe there are troops enough there 
for the defence of Canada forever.”  He even thought limited offensive action might be possible.  
He also stated that the American army was incapable of beating British veterans, “if common 
precautions and care were taken.”  He did not mention Native American help in the defense of 
Canada but rather claimed British veterans could handle the job. 
 The problem was not command incompetence but lack of “naval superiority on the 
Lakes.  Till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible . . . to keep the enemy out of the whole 
frontier, much less to make conquest from the enemy.”  Wellington told Liverpool: “You have 
no right from the state of war to demand any concession of territory from America.”  Having 
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failed to carry the war effectively onto American soil, the cabinet could not “on any principle of 
equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages 
which you have in your power.”
260
  Liverpool had already made the Native American homeland 
demand and now realized he did not have any right to put this in a treaty.  Liverpool knew he had 
overstepped his limit and was now pushing the American delegation without anything to push 
with.  The Native American issue was thus restructured and this is why Liverpool called for a 
return to the ways things were before the war. 
 Even though Goulburn was outlining his plan to defeat the Americans at the bargaining 
table, the mood in London favored peace at any price.  Wellington’s harsh assessment had badly 
rattled Liverpool and dark clouds began to form on the European horizon.  From Vienna, 
Castlreagh warned that the war with America weakened Britain’s position in negotiations.  The 
war was a liability from which little could be won.  Equally worrisome, pro-Bonaparte 
movements in France were gaining support.  If there was an uprising against the imposed 
monarchy, Europe might again be plunged into war.  Having Wellington and a large share of the 
British army overseas would be disastrous.  The political opposition at home was also growing 
from the publication of the Ghent negotiation papers up to the end of August.  The papers 
exposed a British government making war for little purpose other than territorial acquisition.  
Finances were even more of a concern.  With the European war at an end, continuing the 
property tax courted political ruin, but it was necessary to fund the war in America.
261
   
 Liverpool explained to Castlereagh, “We determined, if all other points can be 
satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any 
acquisition of territory.”  He was saying that Britain could not continue to fight a war where our 
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main goal in the peace negotiations is to acquire territory from America, and most of this 
territory would be for the Native Americans.  There were too many other important matters to 
take care of at home (taxes, negotiations in Vienna, pro-Bonaparte movements), the Native 
American homeland, although noble, would have to be shelved. 
 Bathurst had to tell the negotiators in Ghent.  On November 21 and 22 he wrote a series 
of letters: 
You know that I was never much inclined to give away to the Americans.  I am still less 
inclined to do so after the statement of our demands with which the negotiation opened 
and which has in every point of view proved most unfortunate.  Believing however in the 
necessity of the measure you may rely upon our doing the utmost to bring the negotiation 
to a speedy issue…
262
   
 
Goulburn responded to the letters and his bitterness at the virtual abandonment of the Indians 
was evident:   
I had till I came here no idea of the fixed determination which prevails in the breast of 
every American to extirpate the Indians and appropriate their Territory; but I am now 
sure that there is nothing which the people of America would so reluctantly abandon as 
what they are pleased to call their natural right to do so.
263
   
 
Everything on the Native question that Goulburn had been negotiating for so hard was destroyed 
in a matter of days, but as a public servant he continued on and finished the negotiations.   
 On November 27 the British sent their stipulations to the Americans.  John Quincy 
Adams stated “they have definitely abandoned the Indian boundary.”
264
  With the Native 
Americans now abandoned by the British at the negotiating table the Americans took some time 
to work out other issues in the treaty.  Finally on December 24 the Treaty of Ghent was signed.  
Article Nine would contain the Indian dialogue.  The Native American tribes had not been 
consulted during the negotiations and were eventually marginalized by the British in order to 
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conclude a war they no longer had use for.  The most ardent supporter of the Native Americans, 
Henry Goulburn, left Ghent not believing the peace negotiated was good for Britain, Canada, or 
the Indians to whom he tried to remain loyal only in the end to sacrifice them in accordance with 
Liverpool’s instructions.
265
  With the status quo antebellum restored the Native Americans would 
have to face an encroaching America that was unlikely to be forgiving after the way events 
unfolded during the war. 
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Conclusion 
The conclusion of the peace talks at Ghent meant the end of the Indian-British alliance in 
North America.  Britons and Indians came to realize that the days were over when their 
combined might had controlled the Great Lakes and held the keys to the continent. As Britain 
looked elsewhere for power and prosperity, the United States gradually translated its nominal 
hegemony into reality and the Indians developed alternative strategies of survival through 
migration or cultural adaptation.
266
   
 All too soon, the British forgot that the Indians had helped to save Canada from the 
American invasions in 1812 and 1813.  Chapter two discussed how the Native Americans helped 
the British.  By intimidating American troops, the warriors had done more to foil the invaders 
than had the Canadian militia.  Chapter two also discussed the problems the Native Americans 
posed for the British.  Difficult allies, they had irritated British commanders by coming and 
going as they chose and by consuming great quantities of presents and provisions.  British 
officers felt uneasy about their own complicity in the native mode of war.  Embarrassed by 
American propaganda, the British officers sought to distance themselves from allies increasingly 
disdained as savages.
267
 
The Indian confederacy, hopelessly fragmented by the war and Tecumseh’s death was 
doomed.  Within three years all the continent south of the 49
th
 parallel and east of the Mississippi 
River (except what remained of Spanish Florida), had been granted statehood or territorial status.  
Growing numbers of settlers, gold prospectors, buffalo hunters, fortune seekers, and freebooters 
of all kinds had pushed outward to the Missouri River and beyond by the end of the decade.  The 
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Indian nations in their path fled westward as refugees, moved to assigned reservations, or faced 
slaughter by the army.  This pattern would continue until America declared the west won.  Only 
a remnant of the peoples from whom a continent was taken survived.
268
   
As was noted in Chapter 3, Britain did not win any land back for its allies.  The British 
commanders in the Great Lakes country tried to reconcile the Indians to peace terms that fell far 
short of what they had been promised.  The natives would not recover the country north and west 
of the Ohio River, now would the British retain the key fort at Michilimackinac.  Instead, the 
Indians had to settle for a vague promise that they would be restored to their possessions of 1811, 
and they had to trust in their bitter enemies, the Americans, to keep that promise.  Given British 
presents and hollow promises, angry chiefs rebuked the British officers as liars and deceivers.  
The Lakota chief Little Crow insisted: 
After we have fought for you, endured many hardships, lost some of our people and 
awakened the vengeance of our powerful neighbors, you make peace for yourselves, 
leaving us to obtain such terms as we can.  You no longer need our service; you offer us 
these goods to pay us for having deserted us.  But no, we will not take them; we will hold 
them and yourselves in equal contempt.
269
  
 
Many of the Native Americans were too impoverished by war to join Little Crow in rejecting the 
presents of consolation.   
The British army officers resented having to break their own pledges made throughout 
the war.  At Michilimackinac, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall wondered how the world’s 
most powerful empire could grant such generous terms to the crass and defeated republic: 
It is to me an Enigma that I cannot solve that our Country, the first in Wealth, in power, in arms, 
the mistress of the World, swaying the destinies of Europe that she has delivered, . . . that a 
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country exalted to the utmost pinnacle of human greatness should make concession after 
concession and with a cautious and measured policy truckle to a nation . . . of no character.
270
  
During the spring of 1815 McDouall delayed returning Michilimackinac to the Americans in the 
hope that his home government would reconsider the peace treaty.  The delay aggravated 
Americans, for the fortified island was the strategic picot of Indian trade and relations within the 
continent.  Without that fort, the Americans could not persuade Indians that further resistance 
was futile.   
 To resist trade restrictions, the Native Americans sought help from the British.  British 
officers empathized with the Native Americans, but could do nothing about the situation.  
Canada’s new governor-general, Sir Gordon Drummond, expressed a painful sense of dilemma: 
“Many of our faithful allies will apply for succor in their distress.  If it is refused them, we force 
them into the power of their bitterest enemies.  If it is granted them, we inevitably bring on 
another rupture between ourselves and the United States.”
271
  Drummond had to obey his 
restraining orders from London, which he enforced on his subordinates in the Indian country.  
The British chose to abandon their alliance.    
Although the Americans lost the northern war to conquer Canada, they won the western 
war to subdue the Indian resistance.  In 1813, at the Battle of the Thames, they had killed 
Tecumseh, their most formidable Indian adversary and the chief proponent of native unity and 
resistance.  In 1814, Andrew Jackson had used superior numbers to beat the Creeks in Alabama.  
He then forced them to sign away over 20 million acres of land –over half of their domain.  
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Although the Treaty of Ghent committed the Americans to restore Indians to their prewar lands, 
they recovered nothing.
272
   
The mutually beneficial alliance, which began during the French and Indian War, had 
come to nothing after the fighting was over in the War of 1812.  The British bowed to American 
pressure.  The British were no longer permitted to trade with Indians living inside the new 
American borders.  When a British diplomat complained, John Quincy Adams responded, “A 
bitter experience of thirty years had proved that all the Indian Wars in which we had been 
involved, had been kindled by the pestilential breath of British agents and Traders.”
273
 
Native Americans were being displaced, but did display some resistance.  The Cherokee 
Tribe, which had adopted American farming techniques and Christianity, were still forced out of 
their homes.  Andrew Jackson would force them to move on the “Trail of Tears.”  The Black 
Hawk war took place in Illinois, but was over within a year.  Other tribes, such as the Seminoles, 
would resist, but there was never the same Native American unity amongst all of the tribes on the 
continent like in the days of Tecumseh.  Even in Canada Native Americans were being pushed to 
the reservation system.  In Upper Canada Native Americans faced increasing pressure to give up 
their lands.  The population of Upper Canada doubled from 75,000 in 1815 to 150,000 by 1824, 
overwhelming the 8,000 Native Americans.
274
  Between 1815 and 1824 over 7.3 million acres 
was ceded to Canada.  By the mid-1820s, most of the colony’s natives were restricted to reserves 
that resembled the American reservations.
275
 
Further proof that the alliance had ended was the destruction of the warrior culture that 
had previously been defended in Upper Canada.  Natives were pressured to accept Christianity 
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and to practice the European mode of agriculture.  Prior to the war, no British lieutenant 
governor would have endorsed the American policy that sought to restrict, dispossess, and 
transform the Indians.  But after the war Upper Canada’s Indian policy converged with the 
American model.  That convergence made it easier for the British to forsake their alliance with 
the Indians within the American border.
276
    
The War of 1812 was the last chance for the Native Americans save their way of life, but 
it would not happen.  The British-Indian alliance that had been so strong since the French and 
Indian War was now over.  The Native Americans would never recover their ancestral lands and 
would never have the same way of life again.  They would be reluctantly pushed onto  
reservations in both the United States and Canada.   
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